Kant on citizenship: the systematic unity of freedom, equality, and independence

Interest in Kant's legal and political philosophy has grown considerably in recent years. However, despite burgeoning scholarship in the area, many central issues that arise in Kant's political philosophy have gone unaddressed. One such issue is that of the rights and duties associated with citizenship. This thesis is concerned with presenting a systematic understanding of this aspect of Kant’s discussion. I defend three central claims: First, the three rights Kant claims are inseparable from the essence of a citizen—lawful freedom, civil equality, and civil independence—target progressively more determinate conceptions of the citizen as a right-holder. The broadest determination of the concept of a citizen is that of a human being who can act on his or her choices. A narrower determination of the concept of a citizen adds that the free human being is a member of a commonwealth. The complete determination of the concept of a citizen requires that the free and equal member of the commonwealth also be independent. Second, Kant's interpretation of the Ulpian formulae specifies duties associated with these rights. All of the Ulpian duties are quite general. The obligations they impose are not restricted to the commonwealth in which the duty-bearer finds him or herself. They are obligations that we have to ourselves or to all others. However, we will see that despite their generality, the Ulpian duties can only be satisfied in a state. Moreover, each duty corresponds to a right of citizenship. Third, the often-criticized distinction between active and passive citizenship in Kant's discussion is parasitic on the conception of the citizen mentioned above. The first three claims that I make in this thesis amount to a fourth, that I do not argue for explicitly; namely, that Kant's account of citizenship is both philosophically rich, and cohesive with his political philosophy as a whole.