The WTO-Plus Controversy: Taking Stock of ‘More-Stringent’ Commitments in Protocols of Accession

States or customs territories wishing to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) have to negotiate their terms of entry with the incumbent membership. The result of these negotiations is contained in an accession package which contains a Protocol of Accession, a Working Party Report and Schedules of Concessions. Many commentators have expressed their concern about the fact that the WTO’s membership has essentially become two-tiered, with different Members having to adhere to different obligations. 33 accessions have been completed to this day. This paper presents the results of a mapping exercise of all 33 Protocols of Accession and Working Party Reports with the aim of establishing i) whether the number of commitments made by applicants has increased over time; and ii) whether the content of the commitments has become ‘more stringent’ over time. Ultimately, one may question whether the WTO’s accession process poses a risk to the Single-Undertaking that forms the foundation of the organization. However, it is submitted that in order to answer this question, a better understanding is needed of both the amount and content of the commitments that applicants have made upon accession. After recent reports by panels and the Appellate Body, it is clear that one must look closely at the language of the relevant commitment in order to determine its relationship with a provision in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement). Building on prior scholarship, this paper suggests a refined categorization of commitments in Protocols of Accession and examines the commitments in the fields of transparency, anti-dumping and export duties in more detail.status: publishe