Add to ORKGA monopolist sells informative experiments to heterogeneous buyers. Buyers differ in their prior information, and hence in their willingness to pay for additional signals. The monopolist can profitably offer a menu of experiments. We show that, even under costless information acquisition and free degrading of information, the optimal menu is quite coarse. The seller offers at most two experiments, and we derive conditions under which at vs. discriminatory pricing is optimal
My dissertation focuses on information economics in games. In Chapter II, ``Optimal Disclosure of P...
We analyze a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk neutral buyers who ...
We analyze a model of monopolistic price discrimination where only some consumers are originally suf...
A monopolist sells informative experiments to heterogeneous buyers. Buyers differ in their prior info...
A monopolist sells informative experiments to heterogeneous buyers who face a decision problem. Buye...
A data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty. He can augment his initial private informat...
A monopolist seller owns an object that has several attributes. A buyer is privately informed about ...
We study the problem of selling information to a data-buyer who faces a decision problem under uncer...
We consider a general nonlinear pricing environment with private information. We characterize the in...
We investigate profit-maximizing versioning plans for an information goods monopolist. The analysis ...
We analyze the design of dynamic menus to sell experience goods. The quality of the product is initi...
A data broker sells market segmentations created by consumer data to a producer with private product...
We present a continuous-time model of Bayesian learning in a duopolistic market. Initially the value...
Abstract: This paper reports on price formation in experimental markets in which a single seller tr...
The existing literature on information disclosure commonly assumes full commitment to truthful discl...
My dissertation focuses on information economics in games. In Chapter II, ``Optimal Disclosure of P...
We analyze a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk neutral buyers who ...
We analyze a model of monopolistic price discrimination where only some consumers are originally suf...
A monopolist sells informative experiments to heterogeneous buyers. Buyers differ in their prior info...
A monopolist sells informative experiments to heterogeneous buyers who face a decision problem. Buye...
A data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty. He can augment his initial private informat...
A monopolist seller owns an object that has several attributes. A buyer is privately informed about ...
We study the problem of selling information to a data-buyer who faces a decision problem under uncer...
We consider a general nonlinear pricing environment with private information. We characterize the in...
We investigate profit-maximizing versioning plans for an information goods monopolist. The analysis ...
We analyze the design of dynamic menus to sell experience goods. The quality of the product is initi...
A data broker sells market segmentations created by consumer data to a producer with private product...
We present a continuous-time model of Bayesian learning in a duopolistic market. Initially the value...
Abstract: This paper reports on price formation in experimental markets in which a single seller tr...
The existing literature on information disclosure commonly assumes full commitment to truthful discl...
My dissertation focuses on information economics in games. In Chapter II, ``Optimal Disclosure of P...
We analyze a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk neutral buyers who ...
We analyze a model of monopolistic price discrimination where only some consumers are originally suf...