Add to ORKGWe show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses)
Frey argues that if buyers and sellers of labour understand their relationship merely as exchange, w...
This dissertation consists of three essays centered around labor incentives that arise in relative c...
The paper identifies conditions under which ‘inefficient’ favouritism emerges as an optimal outcome ...
We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient p...
While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms are often...
In a simple agency model of the labor market, we examine how fairness concerns affect the structure ...
This article analyzes the role of competitive compensation schemes (in which pay depends on relative...
While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms are often...
We are studying in this article an interplay between workers in organizations under the assumption t...
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his empl...
We are studying in this paper an interplay between workers in organizations under the assumption tha...
16 pages, 1 figure.-- Presidential address delivered at the 34th Symposium of the Spanish Economic A...
The two sides of envy, destructive and competitive, give rise to qualitatively different equilibria,...
Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of...
Frey argues that if buyers and sellers of labour understand their relationship merely as exchange, w...
This dissertation consists of three essays centered around labor incentives that arise in relative c...
The paper identifies conditions under which ‘inefficient’ favouritism emerges as an optimal outcome ...
We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient p...
While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms are often...
In a simple agency model of the labor market, we examine how fairness concerns affect the structure ...
This article analyzes the role of competitive compensation schemes (in which pay depends on relative...
While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms are often...
We are studying in this article an interplay between workers in organizations under the assumption t...
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his empl...
We are studying in this paper an interplay between workers in organizations under the assumption tha...
16 pages, 1 figure.-- Presidential address delivered at the 34th Symposium of the Spanish Economic A...
The two sides of envy, destructive and competitive, give rise to qualitatively different equilibria,...
Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of...
Frey argues that if buyers and sellers of labour understand their relationship merely as exchange, w...
This dissertation consists of three essays centered around labor incentives that arise in relative c...
The paper identifies conditions under which ‘inefficient’ favouritism emerges as an optimal outcome ...