Add to ORKGWe study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for two player, two action games. The surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between player...
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between player...
Carlsson and van Damme (1991, 93) presented a notion of a global game, which is an incomplete inform...
We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and sligh...
Global games are widely used for equilibrium selection to predict behaviour in complete information ...
Abstract. Global games are widely used to predict behaviour in games with strategic comple-mentariti...
Abstract. Global games are widely used to predict behaviour in games with strategic comple-mentariti...
Abstract. We prove that the global game selection in all 3 × 3 payoff-symmetric supermodular games i...
We prove that the global game selection in all 3 x 3 payoff-symmetric supermodular games is independ...
I provide a new proof of uniqueness of equilibrium in a wide class of global games. I show that the ...
In this paper, we are interested in the notions of robustness and contagion in games with strategic ...
We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty about the payoffs. Our game i...
This paper examines many-player many-action global games with multidimensional state parameters. It...
We extend the global games method to finite player, finite action, monotone games. These games inclu...
Games with strategic complementarities (GSC) possess nice properties in terms of learning and struct...
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between player...
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between player...
Carlsson and van Damme (1991, 93) presented a notion of a global game, which is an incomplete inform...
We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and sligh...
Global games are widely used for equilibrium selection to predict behaviour in complete information ...
Abstract. Global games are widely used to predict behaviour in games with strategic comple-mentariti...
Abstract. Global games are widely used to predict behaviour in games with strategic comple-mentariti...
Abstract. We prove that the global game selection in all 3 × 3 payoff-symmetric supermodular games i...
We prove that the global game selection in all 3 x 3 payoff-symmetric supermodular games is independ...
I provide a new proof of uniqueness of equilibrium in a wide class of global games. I show that the ...
In this paper, we are interested in the notions of robustness and contagion in games with strategic ...
We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty about the payoffs. Our game i...
This paper examines many-player many-action global games with multidimensional state parameters. It...
We extend the global games method to finite player, finite action, monotone games. These games inclu...
Games with strategic complementarities (GSC) possess nice properties in terms of learning and struct...
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between player...
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between player...
Carlsson and van Damme (1991, 93) presented a notion of a global game, which is an incomplete inform...