Add to ORKGThe auction of an object is considered, for the case in which one bidder is better-informed than the others concerning the actual value of the object. An equilibrium point solution of the competitive bidding game is determined; at this equilibrium, the expected revenue of the less-well-informed bidders is zero. The case of an object which can take only values from a discrete set is dealt with as the limit of auctions of continuously-valued objects
In this paper, a competitive distribution of auctions is described for an economy consisting of an i...
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure....
This paper analyses competitive bidding via sealed tenders for the case in which the bidders have di...
We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for an item in unlimited supply, such as a dig...
This dissertation studies two elements of auction design that are important to understand environmen...
The thesis is concerned with topics relating to auctions and competitive bidding. In the first chapt...
Multi-object auctions are traditionally analyzed as if they were a number of simultaneous independen...
The literature on patent license auctions in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winni...
An interesting case of competitive bidding with an asymmetrical knowledge about the true value of th...
This paper studies the relationship between the auctioneer's provision of information and the level ...
This Ph.D. Thesis consists of three contributed papers. In the first paper we study multiunit common...
This paper studies the relationship between the auctioneer¿s provision of information and the level ...
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2017.Cataloged from ...
Auctions and bidding models are attracting an ever increasing amount of attention. The Stark and Rot...
This paper investigates a new auction model in which bidders have both copy and budget constraints. ...
In this paper, a competitive distribution of auctions is described for an economy consisting of an i...
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure....
This paper analyses competitive bidding via sealed tenders for the case in which the bidders have di...
We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for an item in unlimited supply, such as a dig...
This dissertation studies two elements of auction design that are important to understand environmen...
The thesis is concerned with topics relating to auctions and competitive bidding. In the first chapt...
Multi-object auctions are traditionally analyzed as if they were a number of simultaneous independen...
The literature on patent license auctions in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winni...
An interesting case of competitive bidding with an asymmetrical knowledge about the true value of th...
This paper studies the relationship between the auctioneer's provision of information and the level ...
This Ph.D. Thesis consists of three contributed papers. In the first paper we study multiunit common...
This paper studies the relationship between the auctioneer¿s provision of information and the level ...
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2017.Cataloged from ...
Auctions and bidding models are attracting an ever increasing amount of attention. The Stark and Rot...
This paper investigates a new auction model in which bidders have both copy and budget constraints. ...
In this paper, a competitive distribution of auctions is described for an economy consisting of an i...
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure....
This paper analyses competitive bidding via sealed tenders for the case in which the bidders have di...