Add to ORKGAccording to Rowlands, personhood in nonhuman animals calls for a unified mental life and pre-reflective self-awareness provides this. The concept of “person” is fuzzy. Any attempt to define it with necessary and sufficient conditions faces the problem of borderline cases satisfying only some of the conditions to varying degrees. We ask about the implications of a metaphysical sense of personhood for its moral and legal sense. Finally, we address Rowlands’s reliance on pre-reflective self-awareness and present our own criteria for personhood
Many debates in arenas such as bioethics turn on questions regarding the moral status of human being...
In Western philosophy, psychology, politics, and law there has been an extended debate about what ...
Rowlands argues that animals have implicit pre-reflective awareness and that this is adequate to cre...
According to Rowlands, personhood in nonhuman animals calls for a unified mental life and pre-reflec...
Rowlands provides an expanded definition of personhood that preserves the requirement of unity of me...
Rowlands (2016) concentrates strictly on the metaphysical concept of person, but his notion of anima...
Rowlands offers a de-intellectualised account of personhood that is meant to secure the unity of a m...
Rowlands (2016) presents a compelling argument for extending personhood to nonhuman animals. Sociolo...
Mark Rowlands argues that at least some animals are persons, based on the idea that (i) many animals...
Mark Rowlands argues that at least some animals are persons, based on the idea that (i) many animals...
Rowlands’s case for attributing personhood to lower animals is ultimately convincing, but along the ...
It is orthodox to suppose that very few, if any, nonhuman animals are persons. The category “person”...
Rowlands applies the two organizing ideas of the Lockean concept of personhood — mental life and uni...
I examine the familiar criterial view of personhood, according to which the possession of personal p...
I argue that Rowlands’s concept of pre-reflective self-awareness offers a way to understand animals ...
Many debates in arenas such as bioethics turn on questions regarding the moral status of human being...
In Western philosophy, psychology, politics, and law there has been an extended debate about what ...
Rowlands argues that animals have implicit pre-reflective awareness and that this is adequate to cre...
According to Rowlands, personhood in nonhuman animals calls for a unified mental life and pre-reflec...
Rowlands provides an expanded definition of personhood that preserves the requirement of unity of me...
Rowlands (2016) concentrates strictly on the metaphysical concept of person, but his notion of anima...
Rowlands offers a de-intellectualised account of personhood that is meant to secure the unity of a m...
Rowlands (2016) presents a compelling argument for extending personhood to nonhuman animals. Sociolo...
Mark Rowlands argues that at least some animals are persons, based on the idea that (i) many animals...
Mark Rowlands argues that at least some animals are persons, based on the idea that (i) many animals...
Rowlands’s case for attributing personhood to lower animals is ultimately convincing, but along the ...
It is orthodox to suppose that very few, if any, nonhuman animals are persons. The category “person”...
Rowlands applies the two organizing ideas of the Lockean concept of personhood — mental life and uni...
I examine the familiar criterial view of personhood, according to which the possession of personal p...
I argue that Rowlands’s concept of pre-reflective self-awareness offers a way to understand animals ...
Many debates in arenas such as bioethics turn on questions regarding the moral status of human being...
In Western philosophy, psychology, politics, and law there has been an extended debate about what ...
Rowlands argues that animals have implicit pre-reflective awareness and that this is adequate to cre...