Add to ORKGRowlands’s case for attributing personhood to lower animals is ultimately convincing, but along the way he fails to highlight several distinctions that are crucial for his argument: Personhood vs. personal identity; the first person vs. its mental episodes; and pre-reflective awareness in general vs. one specific case of it
Rowlands argues that animals have implicit pre-reflective awareness and that this is adequate to cre...
I argue that Rowlands’s concept of pre-reflective self-awareness offers a way to understand animals ...
Reluctance to overextend personhood seems to drive many of the skeptical responses in the first roun...
Rowlands’s case for attributing personhood to lower animals is ultimately convincing, but along the ...
Rowlands’s case for attributing personhood to lower animals is ultimately convincing, but along the ...
Mark Rowlands argues that at least some animals are persons, based on the idea that (i) many animals...
Rowlands provides an expanded definition of personhood that preserves the requirement of unity of me...
Rowlands (2016) presents a compelling argument for extending personhood to nonhuman animals. Sociolo...
Mark Rowlands argues that at least some animals are persons, based on the idea that (i) many animals...
The Rowlands target article makes a case, based on John Locke’s metaphysical argument, that personho...
Rowlands (2016) concentrates strictly on the metaphysical concept of person, but his notion of anima...
It is orthodox to suppose that very few, if any, nonhuman animals are persons. The category “person”...
In my paper I will discuss and argue that non-human animals can attain the status of ???person??? an...
According to Rowlands, personhood in nonhuman animals calls for a unified mental life and pre-reflec...
Mark Rowlands’s (2016) target article invites us to consider individuals in a broad subset of the no...
Rowlands argues that animals have implicit pre-reflective awareness and that this is adequate to cre...
I argue that Rowlands’s concept of pre-reflective self-awareness offers a way to understand animals ...
Reluctance to overextend personhood seems to drive many of the skeptical responses in the first roun...
Rowlands’s case for attributing personhood to lower animals is ultimately convincing, but along the ...
Rowlands’s case for attributing personhood to lower animals is ultimately convincing, but along the ...
Mark Rowlands argues that at least some animals are persons, based on the idea that (i) many animals...
Rowlands provides an expanded definition of personhood that preserves the requirement of unity of me...
Rowlands (2016) presents a compelling argument for extending personhood to nonhuman animals. Sociolo...
Mark Rowlands argues that at least some animals are persons, based on the idea that (i) many animals...
The Rowlands target article makes a case, based on John Locke’s metaphysical argument, that personho...
Rowlands (2016) concentrates strictly on the metaphysical concept of person, but his notion of anima...
It is orthodox to suppose that very few, if any, nonhuman animals are persons. The category “person”...
In my paper I will discuss and argue that non-human animals can attain the status of ???person??? an...
According to Rowlands, personhood in nonhuman animals calls for a unified mental life and pre-reflec...
Mark Rowlands’s (2016) target article invites us to consider individuals in a broad subset of the no...
Rowlands argues that animals have implicit pre-reflective awareness and that this is adequate to cre...
I argue that Rowlands’s concept of pre-reflective self-awareness offers a way to understand animals ...
Reluctance to overextend personhood seems to drive many of the skeptical responses in the first roun...