How can a phenomenological paradigm of inquiry be applied in criminology?

How can a phenomenological paradigm of inquiry be applied in criminology? As pointed out by several authors (Applebaum, 2011; Bauwens, Kennes, & Bauwens, 2013; Guba & Lincoln, 1994), every (criminological) research starts from a certain perspective, from an implicit or explicit paradigm of inquiry. ‘Paradigms of inquiry’ “define for inquirers what it is they are about, and what falls within and outside the limits of legitimate inquiry” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). In general, paradigms of inquiry differ from one another on three levels: (1) ontology, how one perceives the nature of knowledge, (2) epistemology, how humanity and knowledge are related, and (3) methodology, what is required to develop or test knowledge (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108; Howell, 2013, p. 20). One of these paradigms of inquiry is phenomenology. Notwithstanding the philosophical nature of this paradigm, several researchers demonstrated its applicability within human and/or social sciences, be it after careful translation. After exploring some fundamental ideas of three important philosophical phenomenologists (Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty), one way to make this translation from a philosophical approach to an application in criminology will be outlined for illustration, in particular through a study on how people experience ‘to be punished’.status: publishe