We introduce a parameterized measure of partial ownership, the a-endowment lower bound, appropriate to probabilistic allocation. Strikingly, among all convex combinations of efficient and group strategy-proof rules, only Gale's Top Trading Cycles is sd efficient and meets a positive alpha-endowment lower bound (Theorem 2); for efficiency, partial ownership must in fact be complete. We also characterize the rules meeting each alpha-endowment lower bound (Theorem 1). For each bound, the family is a semi-lattice ordered by strength of ownership rights. It includes rules where agents' partial ownership lower bounds are met exactly, rules conferring stronger ownership rights, and the full endowments of TTC. This illustrates the trade-off between...
We consider the problem of (re)allocating the total endowment of an infinitely divisible commodity a...
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a complex...
This paper studies a resource allocation problem in which each individual is responsible but in gene...
This paper considers the allocation of indivisible goods among members of a collective assuming that...
We consider a common indivisible good allocation problem in which agents have both social and privat...
We show that allocation of ownership matters even in a long-term relationship where problems of oppo...
In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in g...
We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments conf...
We consider the problem of (re)allocating the total endowment of an in-¯nitely divisible commodity a...
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a �??comp...
An early prediction of game theory was that respect for ownership—“Bourgeois” or B behavior—can aris...
This article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We consider a setting in which an ups...
We study discrete resource allocation problems in which agents have unit demand and strict preferenc...
In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in such a way that the social w...
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a complex...
We consider the problem of (re)allocating the total endowment of an infinitely divisible commodity a...
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a complex...
This paper studies a resource allocation problem in which each individual is responsible but in gene...
This paper considers the allocation of indivisible goods among members of a collective assuming that...
We consider a common indivisible good allocation problem in which agents have both social and privat...
We show that allocation of ownership matters even in a long-term relationship where problems of oppo...
In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in g...
We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments conf...
We consider the problem of (re)allocating the total endowment of an in-¯nitely divisible commodity a...
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a �??comp...
An early prediction of game theory was that respect for ownership—“Bourgeois” or B behavior—can aris...
This article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We consider a setting in which an ups...
We study discrete resource allocation problems in which agents have unit demand and strict preferenc...
In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in such a way that the social w...
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a complex...
We consider the problem of (re)allocating the total endowment of an infinitely divisible commodity a...
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a complex...
This paper studies a resource allocation problem in which each individual is responsible but in gene...