Although classical agency theorists claim that pay-for-performance is not relevant in the context of private family firms, the authors provide empirical evidence of the opposite, using a sample of 529 privately held U.S. family firms. The results suggest that objective performance-based measures play a significant role in CEO compensation. Additionally, the authors find that in private family firms CEO compensation is more responsive to firm performance in firms with low ownership dispersion and in the controlling-owner stage. Furthermore, the positive pay-for-performance relation is slightly stronger for nonfamily CEOs than for family CEOs.status: publishe
This paper investigates the impact of the founding family’s presence on CEO turnover decisions. We f...
This thesis is about CEO compensation, M&A activity and family firms. In particular, the literature ...
This study investigates the pay-performance relation for directors and managers in a sample of Thai ...
Although classical agency theorists claim that pay-for-performance is not relevant in the context of...
This study examines CEO compensation in family firms, with a particular focus on the effects exerted...
International audienceThis paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by examining relatio...
The relationship between CEO pay and performance has been much analyzed in the management and econom...
This study explores two ownership issues in private family firms. First, we investigate the relation...
This paper investigates CEO compensation structure and dividend policy of small publicly held family...
Family-owned firms use different executive compensation policies depending on whether or not the CEO...
Purpose – Small public family firms apply contracting differently given the peculiar motivations of ...
32 pagesFamily firms account for more than half of listed firms in China, and they are confronted wi...
In this paper, we examine the relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover within the dyna...
Family firms, as insider-controlled companies, should be less likely to exhibit CEO turnover after p...
Although large owners monitor managers effectively, they differ in important ways. Whereas founder o...
This paper investigates the impact of the founding family’s presence on CEO turnover decisions. We f...
This thesis is about CEO compensation, M&A activity and family firms. In particular, the literature ...
This study investigates the pay-performance relation for directors and managers in a sample of Thai ...
Although classical agency theorists claim that pay-for-performance is not relevant in the context of...
This study examines CEO compensation in family firms, with a particular focus on the effects exerted...
International audienceThis paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by examining relatio...
The relationship between CEO pay and performance has been much analyzed in the management and econom...
This study explores two ownership issues in private family firms. First, we investigate the relation...
This paper investigates CEO compensation structure and dividend policy of small publicly held family...
Family-owned firms use different executive compensation policies depending on whether or not the CEO...
Purpose – Small public family firms apply contracting differently given the peculiar motivations of ...
32 pagesFamily firms account for more than half of listed firms in China, and they are confronted wi...
In this paper, we examine the relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover within the dyna...
Family firms, as insider-controlled companies, should be less likely to exhibit CEO turnover after p...
Although large owners monitor managers effectively, they differ in important ways. Whereas founder o...
This paper investigates the impact of the founding family’s presence on CEO turnover decisions. We f...
This thesis is about CEO compensation, M&A activity and family firms. In particular, the literature ...
This study investigates the pay-performance relation for directors and managers in a sample of Thai ...