Under the Influence?: Election Law and Redistributive Policy in the United States

Drawing on the theoretical perspective that political, and in particular electoral, institutions influence the incentives of policymakers, this study examines the extent to which variation in US state election law is associated with variation in redistributive policy expenditures. In this paper, I utilize time series data from the period 1976-2018 across the 50 states to attempt to empirically assess whether reforms that decrease the political leverage of economic elites or expand the electorate increase the redistributive orientation of the state government. Following those two potential mechanisms––an elite-centered and a mass-based approach––I develop several empirical models to examine the relationship between electoral rules (the stringency of campaign finance law and presence or absence of same-day registration and absentee voting) and the percentage of the state budget devoted to Public Welfare or cash assistance payments as determined by the U.S. Census Annual Survey of State Government Finances. I find evidence under model specifications that do not include time effects to suggest that more stringent campaign finance legislation and no-excuse absentee voting are associated with higher proportions of redistributive expenditures, and that this campaign finance effect is due to restrictions on individual, rather than PAC, contributions. I do not find evidence to support the hypothesis that more lenient registration dates or no-excuse absentee voting are associated with changes in the composition of the electorate overall. However, in no models with time effects are these stated relationships significant.Bachelor of Art