The Chief Executive: Kennedy, Crisis, and Decision-Making

This thesis explores how John F. Kennedy’s style of executive management impacted his administration’s decision-making process. After the failures in Cuba and Vienna, Kennedy came to several conclusions: elaborate machinery was not innately ineffective; he should trust his advisors; and he should avail himself of more dissenting opinions. Based on these lessons, Kennedy rebuilt some of the formal foreign policy machinery that he had previously dismantled, relinquished his grip on policy creation, and halted debate until he could hear from noteworthy advocates of more hawkish policy. Current scholarship fails to connect the Berlin crisis, Kennedy’s leadership, and modern management theory. Many presidential historians use the Cuban missile crisis to demonstrate that Kennedy had finally learned from the Bay of Pigs and Vienna disasters. In contrast, this thesis shows that Kennedy corrected his mistakes in Berlin, more than a year before the Cuban Missile Crisis. Process mattered. By slowing down the pace of internal debate, relying more on his advisors, and rebuilding the machinery that he had previously scrapped, Kennedy reached better decisions. Besides its scholarly insights into historical events, this thesis sheds light on vital questions about leadership and decision-making. Kennedy carried the burden of leading the United States in an era of existential nuclear danger. The president’s triumph was the preservation of peace. Kennedy’s change of direction on Berlin offers a powerful blueprint for anyone who has had to learn from failure.Bachelor of Art