Add to ORKGThis study considers how present-biased preferences influence public debt policy when a violation of debt rules is possible. To address this issue, the study extends the framework of Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (American Economic Review 105, (2015), 1711--1737) by allowing for rule breaking with extra costs, and we show that rule breaking occurs when a country exhibits a strong present bias. We further extend the model by introducing a political process for determining the debt rule, and we show that a polarization of debt rules emerges between countries with high and low degrees of present bias
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) show that a country that has access to a sufficiently rich asset market cann...
Theoretical literature seeking to explain public-debt accumulation exploded in recent years as debt ...
Public debt (as opposed to current taxation) alters the inter-temporal pattern of tax rates-it reduc...
This study considers how present-biased preferences influence public debt policy when a violation of...
In this study, we investigate the international coordination of debt rules in an economy consisting ...
In this paper, we consider if extreme policies in terms of more polarized budgets can occur under th...
We examine debt-sensitive majority rules. According to such a rule, the higher a planned public debt...
Democracy tends to cultivate short-sighted politicians, for whom the horizon extends more or less ti...
Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic ” rationale for benev-olent government intervention. ...
Policy rules can be welfare improving if the government faces a time inconsistency problem when it c...
This thesis is composed by two articles. In the first paper, co-authored with Roberto Pancrazi, we s...
We develop a two period model to investigate what makes the promise to repay public debt credible. W...
This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment designed to study political distortions ...
Models of strategic debt predict that public debt increases with polarization, measured by the ideol...
This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed ...
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) show that a country that has access to a sufficiently rich asset market cann...
Theoretical literature seeking to explain public-debt accumulation exploded in recent years as debt ...
Public debt (as opposed to current taxation) alters the inter-temporal pattern of tax rates-it reduc...
This study considers how present-biased preferences influence public debt policy when a violation of...
In this study, we investigate the international coordination of debt rules in an economy consisting ...
In this paper, we consider if extreme policies in terms of more polarized budgets can occur under th...
We examine debt-sensitive majority rules. According to such a rule, the higher a planned public debt...
Democracy tends to cultivate short-sighted politicians, for whom the horizon extends more or less ti...
Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic ” rationale for benev-olent government intervention. ...
Policy rules can be welfare improving if the government faces a time inconsistency problem when it c...
This thesis is composed by two articles. In the first paper, co-authored with Roberto Pancrazi, we s...
We develop a two period model to investigate what makes the promise to repay public debt credible. W...
This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment designed to study political distortions ...
Models of strategic debt predict that public debt increases with polarization, measured by the ideol...
This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed ...
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) show that a country that has access to a sufficiently rich asset market cann...
Theoretical literature seeking to explain public-debt accumulation exploded in recent years as debt ...
Public debt (as opposed to current taxation) alters the inter-temporal pattern of tax rates-it reduc...