Researchers have found that voting can help increase voluntary contributions to a public good—provided enforcement through a third party. Not all collective agreements, however, guarantee third-party enforcement. We design an experiment to explore whether a voting rule with and without endogenous punishment increases contributions to a public good. Our results suggest that voting by itself does not increase cooperation, but if voters can punish violators, contributions increase significantly. While costly punishment increases contributions at the price of lower efficiency, overall efficiency for a voting-with-punishment rule still exceeds the level observed for a voting-without-punishment rule
This paper studies contributions and punishments in a linear public good game, where group members h...
We explore public good experiments in which players have the opportunity to form cooperative coaliti...
This paper reports the results of a public good experiment with voting. The standard game in which s...
"Researchers have found that voting can help increase voluntary contributions to a public good-provi...
In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a publi...
We examine the role one-time threats of expulsion and punishment have on voluntary contributions in ...
We consider a voluntary contributions game, in which players may punish others after contributions a...
Governments sometimes promote rules backed by sanctions too weak to make obedience privately optimal...
Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We comp...
Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We comp...
In this experimental study we analyze one individual and three collective punishment rules in a publ...
Recent public goods experiments have shown that free riding can be curtailed through mutual monitori...
Social norms can help to foster cooperation and to overcome the free-rider problem in private provis...
In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally investigate the impact ...
This paper explores whether public or private third-party punishment is more effective in promoting ...
This paper studies contributions and punishments in a linear public good game, where group members h...
We explore public good experiments in which players have the opportunity to form cooperative coaliti...
This paper reports the results of a public good experiment with voting. The standard game in which s...
"Researchers have found that voting can help increase voluntary contributions to a public good-provi...
In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a publi...
We examine the role one-time threats of expulsion and punishment have on voluntary contributions in ...
We consider a voluntary contributions game, in which players may punish others after contributions a...
Governments sometimes promote rules backed by sanctions too weak to make obedience privately optimal...
Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We comp...
Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We comp...
In this experimental study we analyze one individual and three collective punishment rules in a publ...
Recent public goods experiments have shown that free riding can be curtailed through mutual monitori...
Social norms can help to foster cooperation and to overcome the free-rider problem in private provis...
In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally investigate the impact ...
This paper explores whether public or private third-party punishment is more effective in promoting ...
This paper studies contributions and punishments in a linear public good game, where group members h...
We explore public good experiments in which players have the opportunity to form cooperative coaliti...
This paper reports the results of a public good experiment with voting. The standard game in which s...