There are two means of changing the expected value of a risk: changing the probability of a reward or changing the reward. Theoretically, the former produces a greater change in expected utility for risk-averse agents. This paper uses two formats of a risk preference elicitation mechanism under two decision frames to test this hypothesis. After controlling for decision error, probability weighting, and order effects, subjects, on average, are slightly risk averse and prefer an increase in the expected value of a risk due to increasing the probability over a compensated increase in the reward. There is substantial across-format inconsistency but very little within-format inconsistency at the individual level
Imagine that you own a five-outcome gamble with the following payoffs and probabilities: ($100, .20;...
BACKGROUND: There are few clinical tools that assess decision-making under risk. Tests that characte...
How does risk tolerance vary with stake size? This important question cannot be adequately answered ...
There are two means of changing the expected value of a risk: changing the probability of a reward o...
Why would people pay more for a $50 gift certificate than for the opportunity to receive a gift cert...
Risk and reward are negatively correlated in a wide variety of environments, and in many cases this ...
We explore risk preference elicitation via direct choice over lotteries. Our choice tasks differ inc...
In this paper we show that the wildly popular Holt and Laury (2002) risk preference elicitation meth...
Risk and reward are negatively correlated in a wide variety of environments, and in many cases this ...
It has long been assumed in economic theory that multi-attribute decisions involving several attribu...
Understanding human behavior from the perspective of normative and descriptive theories depends on h...
The theory of expected utility maximization (EUM) explains risk aversion as due to diminishing margi...
Research on preference reversals has demonstrated a disproportionate influence of outcome probabilit...
A menu of paired lottery choices is structured so that the crossover point to the high-risk lottery ...
In one experiment we studied the extent to which theories of judgment, decision-making and memory ca...
Imagine that you own a five-outcome gamble with the following payoffs and probabilities: ($100, .20;...
BACKGROUND: There are few clinical tools that assess decision-making under risk. Tests that characte...
How does risk tolerance vary with stake size? This important question cannot be adequately answered ...
There are two means of changing the expected value of a risk: changing the probability of a reward o...
Why would people pay more for a $50 gift certificate than for the opportunity to receive a gift cert...
Risk and reward are negatively correlated in a wide variety of environments, and in many cases this ...
We explore risk preference elicitation via direct choice over lotteries. Our choice tasks differ inc...
In this paper we show that the wildly popular Holt and Laury (2002) risk preference elicitation meth...
Risk and reward are negatively correlated in a wide variety of environments, and in many cases this ...
It has long been assumed in economic theory that multi-attribute decisions involving several attribu...
Understanding human behavior from the perspective of normative and descriptive theories depends on h...
The theory of expected utility maximization (EUM) explains risk aversion as due to diminishing margi...
Research on preference reversals has demonstrated a disproportionate influence of outcome probabilit...
A menu of paired lottery choices is structured so that the crossover point to the high-risk lottery ...
In one experiment we studied the extent to which theories of judgment, decision-making and memory ca...
Imagine that you own a five-outcome gamble with the following payoffs and probabilities: ($100, .20;...
BACKGROUND: There are few clinical tools that assess decision-making under risk. Tests that characte...
How does risk tolerance vary with stake size? This important question cannot be adequately answered ...