Consistent with the premise that make‐whole call provisions enhance value‐creating financial flexibility, we find that higher sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock price (delta) increases the likelihood that corporate bonds contain make‐whole provisions. Building on the results of related research, post‐issue financial performance of make‐whole callable bond issuers increases in delta. In line with prior findings that demonstrate financial flexibility can be costly to bondholders, we find that managerial equity incentives impact the incremental effect of make‐whole provisions on the pricing of corporate debt securities. Consistent with the flexibility explanation, we also find that the market response as measured by abnormal trading vol...
This study examines whether and how CEO equity incentives relate to financing choices (i.e., debt an...
Using a sample of US non-financial firms we show that an increase in risk-taking incentives in CEO p...
We examine the relation between CEOs’ equity incentives and their use of performance-sensitive debt ...
We examine the relation between CEOs’ equity incentives and their use of performance-sensitive debt ...
In this paper we provide new evidence that corporate financing decisions are associated with manager...
Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives’ portfolio sensitiv...
This study investigates the effects of the value of financial flexibility (VOFF) on corporate invest...
This study examines how different components of executive compensation affect the cost of debt. We f...
Chapter 1: This chapter examines variations in corporate debt features with respect to changes in ma...
This paper presents an empirical investigation to study the effect of financial flexibility on capit...
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. We propose a novel approach to measure the value that shareholders assign to fi...
Most firms tend to deleverage from the historical peak market-leverage (ML) ratios to near-zero ML w...
This dissertation studies capital structure decisions of levered and unlevered firms using the model...
This thesis is structured into two main parts to investigate the role of financial flexibility in fi...
We study the inefficiencies stemming from a firm’s operating flexibility under debt. We find that fl...
This study examines whether and how CEO equity incentives relate to financing choices (i.e., debt an...
Using a sample of US non-financial firms we show that an increase in risk-taking incentives in CEO p...
We examine the relation between CEOs’ equity incentives and their use of performance-sensitive debt ...
We examine the relation between CEOs’ equity incentives and their use of performance-sensitive debt ...
In this paper we provide new evidence that corporate financing decisions are associated with manager...
Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives’ portfolio sensitiv...
This study investigates the effects of the value of financial flexibility (VOFF) on corporate invest...
This study examines how different components of executive compensation affect the cost of debt. We f...
Chapter 1: This chapter examines variations in corporate debt features with respect to changes in ma...
This paper presents an empirical investigation to study the effect of financial flexibility on capit...
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. We propose a novel approach to measure the value that shareholders assign to fi...
Most firms tend to deleverage from the historical peak market-leverage (ML) ratios to near-zero ML w...
This dissertation studies capital structure decisions of levered and unlevered firms using the model...
This thesis is structured into two main parts to investigate the role of financial flexibility in fi...
We study the inefficiencies stemming from a firm’s operating flexibility under debt. We find that fl...
This study examines whether and how CEO equity incentives relate to financing choices (i.e., debt an...
Using a sample of US non-financial firms we show that an increase in risk-taking incentives in CEO p...
We examine the relation between CEOs’ equity incentives and their use of performance-sensitive debt ...