A quitting game framework for self-organized D2D mobile relaying in 5G

Abstract Offloading the network, minimizing the power consumption as well as reducing interference are important issues in wireless networks. These requirements mandates that future cellular networks need to use Device-to-Device communication as a key enabler. To harness this solution, we propose a two-device system that combines cellular and Device-to-Device (D2D) communication in an uplink communication. We model this system as a quitting game where devices choose simultaneously either to continue or to quit transmitting over the cellular network. The devices will strategically choose whether to compete or to cooperate through mobile relaying. We first calculate the throughput and the outage probability in a fading channel, then we find the Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium of this game by determining the pure and mixed Nash equilibrium of each subgame. Results show that the outage probability depends on the transmission power and the distance separating a device from its serving BS. The quitting decision of devices depends on the fraction of throughput they would get after quitting, on the quitting frame and on the quitting regret