Climbing to the summit : on the burdens of philosophising

Thinkers of the West put forward a guiding idea of perfection to be achieved in theoretical as well as in practical philosophy. They argued that the accomplishment of these tasks depended on making refined conceptual distinctions, necessary for the separation of the opinions of the vulgar from true knowledge and of popular moral beliefs from justified moral virtues and rules. In the early modern era philosophers (like Spinoza and Leibniz) were convinced that human reason is capable of cognition sub specie aeternitatis, i.e. from a divine perspective. Later philosophers (like Hegel) believed it to be possible to build philosophical systems of absolute knowledge. If philosophising had been based only on the assumption of infinite human cognitive ability, it would have been the source of illusions rather than well-justified knowledge. Striving for the ideal of true knowledge of reality needed persistent enquiries, discussions, conceptual analyses, etc., frequently accompanied by doubts and hesitations on the part of philosophers concerning the objectives of their investigations and the methods used. That is why critical analyses of one’s own thoughts and those of others have always played a crucial role in philosophy. The continued effort to challenge arguments and to question conceited claims to have discovered fully reliable methods of cognition are at the very heart of philosophy. Striving for truth and moral perfection without the toil of confronting one’s convictions with critical enquiry is not a way that leads to the summit, from which the world can be seen in its complexity and unity, but self-deception and a manifestation of hubris. But even critical enquiry is not enough, therefore, in many philosophies from the beginning until now religious, mystic experience transcending rational cognition has been regarded as the final stage of human cognition, made possible by the grace of the gods or God