The Effects of Agency Costs and Insiders' Shareholdings on Financing Choices

對於融資決策而言，凡是與資金籌措相關的議題，必須考慮資金成本、財務風險、控制權、供應期間及可能產生的代理問題，並透過財務槓桿的運用，決定採取何種融資決策方式取得資金成本，進而影響公司價值。本研究主要係探討公司的負債及權益之代理成本對融資決策之影響。其次，驗證公司之內部人持股對負債及權益代理成本與融資決策的關係之影響。 實證結果發現，不論是前期或當期的負債代理成本愈高，公司愈傾向選擇現金增資來融資；不論是前一期或當期的權益代理成本愈高，公司愈傾向選擇負債方式融資。而在私募股權融資方面，也顯示不論是前一期或當期負債的代理成本愈高，公司愈傾向選擇私募股權來融資；前期權益代理成本愈高，公司在當期不傾向選擇私募股權來融資。 另一方面，若考慮內部人持股因素，前期或當期的負債代理成本仍與現金增資融資呈正相關；前期的權益代理成本仍與現金增資融資呈負相關，但當期權益代理成本則無關。而內部人持股因素會使前期權益成本與公司不選擇現金增資的關係減弱；內部人持股會使前期負債成本與公司採用私募股權融資無關，以及前期權益代理成本與私募股權融資無關。This study investigates the effects of debt agency cost and equity agency cost on financing choices of a firm. We further examine the effects of the shareholdings of insiders on the association between debt and equity agency costs and financing choices. The evidences show that the firm with higher debt agency costs of current and lag-one periods tends to engage in seasoned equity offerings to raise capital, and the firm with higher equity agency costs of current and lag-one periods tends to adopt debt financing. Moreover, the firm with higher debt agency costs of current and lag-one periods tends to use private equity financing, and the firm with a higher equity agency cost of lag-one period do not tend to perform private equity financing. On the other hand, when considering the shareholdings of insiders, we find that, debt agency costs of current and lag-one periods are still positively related to seasoned equity offerings, and the choice seasoned equity offerings is still negatively related to equity agency cost of lag-one period but is unrelated to current equity agency cost. By the interaction term of agency cost and insiders' shareholdings, the findings show that, the shareholdings of insiders reduce the relation between prior equity agency cost and seasoned equity offerings choice, and induce that private equity financings are unrelated to debt agency cost and equity agency cost of lag-one period.摘 要.....I Abstract.....II 目 次.....III 表目次.....IV 圖目次.....V 第一章 緒論.....1 第一節 研究背景與動機.....1 第二節 研究目的.....3 第三節 研究貢獻.....4 第四節 研究架構及流程.....4 第二章 文獻探討.....7 第一節 權益代理成本的相關文獻.....7 第二節 負債代理成本的相關文獻.....9 第三節 融資理論之相關文獻.....10 第四節 內部人持股的相關文獻.....11 第三章 研究設計.....13 第一節 理論及研究假說形成.....13 第二節 研究期間、取樣標準與取樣來源.....15 第三節 研究方法.....17 第四節 變數定義.....20 第四章 實證分析.....23 第一節 樣本分析.....23 第二節 代理成本與現金增資及私募之關聯性.....27 第三節 內部人持股對代理成本與現金增資及私募關係之影響.....33 第五章結論與建議.....43 第一節 研究結論.....43 第二節 研究限制與未來研究方向.....45 參考文獻.....4