Government Subsidy for Corporate R&D and Corporate R&D Investments：An Analytical Framework Based on the Contingency Theory

【中文摘要】研发的不确定性及技术溢出的外部性特征导致的市场失灵，需要政府的适时干预，对企业研发活动进行有效的补助。然而，政府研发补助政策效应的研究未能得到一致的结论。本文借鉴权变理论（ contingency theory）的思路， 引入创新风险作为权变因子， 将政府研发补助政策效应视为政府研发补助、企业特征与创新风险的耦合效应。本文构建基于权变理论的政府研发补助政策效应分析框架，较好地解释了政府研发补助政策效应的复杂性，为未来完善政府研发补助政策提供思路。 【Abstract】The market failure caused by the substantial uncertainty of rewards for corporate R&D and technology-spillover externality calls for government intervention in corporate R&D activities through subsidization. However，there is no consensus in the literature on the policy effect of government subsidies for corporate R&D on the outcomes of corporate R&D investments. Based on the contingency theory，this paper introduces innovation risks as a contingency factor and takes the policy effect of government subsidies on the outcomes of corporate R&D investments as the coupling effect of government subsidization，corporate characteristics，and innovation risks. This analytical framework for government subsidy policy can explain the inconsistency of existing results，and may help to improve the effectiveness of government subsidy policy in the future.本文受到国家社会科学基金项目“财务报告目标、会计信息功能与资本市场适应性研究”（ 17BGL067）和福建省中青年教师教育科研项目“战略新兴视角下福建省生物产业融资估值研究”（ JAS160252）的资助