Political Order and Disorder in Weak States : Comparing Explanations of State Failure and non-Failure in two West African and two Central Asian States

States that lack complete control of peripheral regions might be qualified as weak, and previous research suggests that they face an increased risk of state failure. Yet, in the periphery of many states, authority is shared by the government and non-state actors. Far from all these “weak” states are “failed” in the sense of failing to provide services and political order to their inhabitants. Before exploring this enigma, an attempt to clear the conceptual haze surrounding the notions of weakness and failure is made. An investigation into when state weakness leads to state failure – and when it does not – is thereafter undertaken, using a process-tracing method. The thesis explores the structure of state-society relations in two pairs of most similar cases: first Mali and Niger, then Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. All cases are studied over a period of 15 to 25 years and with the aim of determining whether any of two theoretical mechanisms developed from former research holds more value in explaining when weak states fail and when they do not. The first mechanism portrays how weak states construct informal networks of power and fail when these break down, the other depicts how a weak state’s survival is dependent on its ability to uphold a negotiated relationship with non-state actors. State failure in Mali is found to be explained by the failure of negotiated relationships between state and non-state actors. State failure in Tajikistan, on the other hand, can be explained by the government’s incapacity to dominate non-state actors through informal networks of power. However, support for the conclusion that weak states generally seek to govern through negotiated agreements with non-state actors, in line with the second theoretical perspective, is found