DOMESTIC DRIVERS IN NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

The prevailing explanation today claims that security concerns motivate North Korea to develop nuclear weapons and that the motivation would decrease if the concerns diminish. Nevertheless, given that the international community since the 1990s has failed to prevent North Korea from securing nuclear weapons, questions arise as to whether it properly identified North Korea’s motivations and whether those motivations remained unchanged. In this respect, this thesis investigates the question: “Historically, to what extent have domestic political concerns been a driver for North Korea in deciding on its nuclear weapons program?” The thesis argues that domestic politics became the prevailing motivation for the program from 1994 to 2009. The security perspective explains that Kim Jong-il, who monopolized power, behaved on behalf of national interests, and that the growing South Korean military capabilities and U.S. hardline policy motivated him to develop nuclear weapons. Yet, many of Kim Jong-il’s actions in this period did not coincide with national security preservation. In this regard, the domestic political perspective explains that his domestic political interests motivated him to develop nuclear weapons and that he used the program as a source of money and useful pretext for legitimizing his regime. Especially, North Korea’s response to the U.S. sanctions on the Banco Delta Asia shows that Kim Jong-il’s domestic political interests were the prevailing driver for the program.http://archive.org/details/domesticdriversi1094564101Major, Republic of Korea Air ForceApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited