Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic. We call the vertical characteristic quality. The difference in the quality levels determines how the firms share the market. Firms know the quality levels, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may signal its own quality. Under comparative advertising firms may signal the quality differential. In both scenarios the firms may attempt to mislead at a cost. If firms advertise, in both scenarios equilibria are revealing. Under comparative advertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non-comparative advertising
We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal, using a model where an entrant can choose t...
Only recently, competition authorities tend to agree on comparative advertising being helpful in pr...
Only recently, competition authorities tend to agree on comparative advertising being helpful in pr...
Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic. We call the vertical ch...
Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The differe...
Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The differe...
Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical character-istic called quality. The differ...
In markets where firms sell similar goods to their competitors, firms may be able to free-ride off t...
We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal using a model where an entrant can choose to...
Improved consumer information about (symmetric) products can lead to better matching but also higher...
In this paper, we examine firms ’ quality positions when consumers can only con-sider purchasing pro...
We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal, using a model where an entrant can choose t...
Improved consumer information about horizontal aspects of products of similar quality leads to bette...
We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal, using a model where an entrant can choose t...
Comparative advertising content differs from generic. We discover that dissipative advertising has c...
We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal, using a model where an entrant can choose t...
Only recently, competition authorities tend to agree on comparative advertising being helpful in pr...
Only recently, competition authorities tend to agree on comparative advertising being helpful in pr...
Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic. We call the vertical ch...
Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The differe...
Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The differe...
Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical character-istic called quality. The differ...
In markets where firms sell similar goods to their competitors, firms may be able to free-ride off t...
We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal using a model where an entrant can choose to...
Improved consumer information about (symmetric) products can lead to better matching but also higher...
In this paper, we examine firms ’ quality positions when consumers can only con-sider purchasing pro...
We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal, using a model where an entrant can choose t...
Improved consumer information about horizontal aspects of products of similar quality leads to bette...
We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal, using a model where an entrant can choose t...
Comparative advertising content differs from generic. We discover that dissipative advertising has c...
We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal, using a model where an entrant can choose t...
Only recently, competition authorities tend to agree on comparative advertising being helpful in pr...
Only recently, competition authorities tend to agree on comparative advertising being helpful in pr...