Add to ORKGIn this paper we present a model of credit market with several homogeneous lenders competing to finance an investment project. Contracts are non-exclusive, hence the borrower can accept whatever subset of the offered loans. We use the model to discuss efficiency issues in competitive economies with asymmetric information and non-exclusive agreements. We characterize the equilibria of this common agency game with moral hazard and show that they all belong to the constrained Pareto frontier
We analyze the Pareto optimal contracts between lenders and borrowers in a model with asymmetric inf...
The authors analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk ...
In this paper, we study a two-period pure exchange economy with idiosyncratic uncertainty, moral haz...
In this paper we present a model of credit market with several homogeneous lenders competing to fina...
This paper studies the relationship between competition and incentives in an economy with financial ...
This paper studies the relationship between competition and incentives in an economy with financial ...
International audienceWe study a credit market in which multiple lenders sequentially offer financin...
The thesis contributes to the study of the relationship between competition and incentives, when asy...
We study a capital market in which multiple lenders sequentially attempt at financing a single borro...
We make a first step in the literature to analyze a hybrid model of credit rationing with simultaneo...
We analyze the Pareto optimal contracts between lenders and borrowers in a model with asymmetric inf...
We analyse the Pareto optimal contracts between lenders and borrowers in a model with asymmetric inf...
We rationalize fixed rate loan commitments (forward credit contracting with options) in a competitiv...
This paper explores the productivity and income distribution effects of asymmetric information and r...
We analyze the Pareto optimal contracts between lenders and borrowers in a model with asymmetric inf...
The authors analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk ...
In this paper, we study a two-period pure exchange economy with idiosyncratic uncertainty, moral haz...
In this paper we present a model of credit market with several homogeneous lenders competing to fina...
This paper studies the relationship between competition and incentives in an economy with financial ...
This paper studies the relationship between competition and incentives in an economy with financial ...
International audienceWe study a credit market in which multiple lenders sequentially offer financin...
The thesis contributes to the study of the relationship between competition and incentives, when asy...
We study a capital market in which multiple lenders sequentially attempt at financing a single borro...
We make a first step in the literature to analyze a hybrid model of credit rationing with simultaneo...
We analyze the Pareto optimal contracts between lenders and borrowers in a model with asymmetric inf...
We analyse the Pareto optimal contracts between lenders and borrowers in a model with asymmetric inf...
We rationalize fixed rate loan commitments (forward credit contracting with options) in a competitiv...
This paper explores the productivity and income distribution effects of asymmetric information and r...
We analyze the Pareto optimal contracts between lenders and borrowers in a model with asymmetric inf...
The authors analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk ...
In this paper, we study a two-period pure exchange economy with idiosyncratic uncertainty, moral haz...