Add to ORKGTwo types of agents interact on a pre-existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type. We ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platform and make a profit. We show that this might be impossible if intra-group negative externalities are sufficiently (but not too) strong with respect to positive inter-group externalities
We study a model that involves identity-dependent, asymmetric negative external effects. Willingness...
A market has network externalities if a consumer’s utility from purchasing a prod-uct depends on whi...
This paper studies the incentives to engage in exclusionary pricing in the context of twosided marke...
Two types of agents itneract on a pre-existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence ...
In this article we analyze asymmetric two-sided markets. Two types of agents are assumed to interact...
This paper analyses a two-sided market in which two platforms compete against each other. One side, ...
Two-Sided Markets with Negative Externalities 1 This paper analyses a two-sidedmarket in which two p...
In this paper a two-sided-market is analysed in which two platforms compete against each other. One ...
Many markets involve two groups of agents who interact via “platforms,“ where one group's benefit fr...
The existing literature on two-sided markets addresses participa-tion externalities but so far it ha...
There are many examples of markets involving two groups of agents who need to interact via platforms...
The e-marketplaces, which play an important role in facilitating transactions and aggregating inform...
Consider a firm advertising in a job matching agency with the aim of employing the most qualified wo...
We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the stand...
We study a model that involves identity-dependent, asymmetric negative external effects. Willingness...
A market has network externalities if a consumer’s utility from purchasing a prod-uct depends on whi...
This paper studies the incentives to engage in exclusionary pricing in the context of twosided marke...
Two types of agents itneract on a pre-existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence ...
In this article we analyze asymmetric two-sided markets. Two types of agents are assumed to interact...
This paper analyses a two-sided market in which two platforms compete against each other. One side, ...
Two-Sided Markets with Negative Externalities 1 This paper analyses a two-sidedmarket in which two p...
In this paper a two-sided-market is analysed in which two platforms compete against each other. One ...
Many markets involve two groups of agents who interact via “platforms,“ where one group's benefit fr...
The existing literature on two-sided markets addresses participa-tion externalities but so far it ha...
There are many examples of markets involving two groups of agents who need to interact via platforms...
The e-marketplaces, which play an important role in facilitating transactions and aggregating inform...
Consider a firm advertising in a job matching agency with the aim of employing the most qualified wo...
We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the stand...
We study a model that involves identity-dependent, asymmetric negative external effects. Willingness...
A market has network externalities if a consumer’s utility from purchasing a prod-uct depends on whi...
This paper studies the incentives to engage in exclusionary pricing in the context of twosided marke...