The paper sets out to tackle the following puzzle when indisers of a firm have more information than outside investors. The insiders' desire to sell overpriced securities creates an Adverse Selection problem leading to two contradictory results. On the one hand, it leads to Myers & Majluf (1984)'s Pecking-Order hypothesis that says that debt finance dominates equity finance. On the other hand it leads to Stiglitz & Weiss (1981)' credit rationing whose consequence is that equity finance dominates debt finance. The paper resolves the puzzle by allowing firms to issue both debt and equity together and by having a general notion of what it is that insiders know more about. Then the Pecking-Order hypothesis and credit rationing only emerge as ...
This paper analyzes debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment when a firm's insiders h...
This study investigates empirically the factors that determine whether firms borrow from banks and o...
[[abstract]]Considering conflicts between shareholders and managers, we revisit the external pecking...
The paper sets out to tackle the following puzzle when insiders of a firm have more information than...
When insiders (management) of a firm have more information than outsiders (investors) then insiders’...
When insiders (management) of a firm have more information than outsiders (investors) then insiders’...
SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:5300.405(387) / BLDSC - British Libra...
In this article we model the financing decisions of a firm as a sequential signaling game. We prove ...
In this article we model the financing decisions of a firm as a sequential signaling game. We prove ...
Previous theories of "nancial market rationing focussed on a single market, either the credit o...
In this paper we examine how the quantity of information generated about firm prospects can be impro...
Previous theories of financial market rationing focused on a single market, either the credit or the...
Abstract: Previous theories of financial market rationing focussed on a single market, either the cr...
Previous theories of financial market rationing focussed on a single market, either the credit or th...
The paper presents a simple model arguing that the pecking order theory is an extreme when there is ...
This paper analyzes debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment when a firm's insiders h...
This study investigates empirically the factors that determine whether firms borrow from banks and o...
[[abstract]]Considering conflicts between shareholders and managers, we revisit the external pecking...
The paper sets out to tackle the following puzzle when insiders of a firm have more information than...
When insiders (management) of a firm have more information than outsiders (investors) then insiders’...
When insiders (management) of a firm have more information than outsiders (investors) then insiders’...
SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:5300.405(387) / BLDSC - British Libra...
In this article we model the financing decisions of a firm as a sequential signaling game. We prove ...
In this article we model the financing decisions of a firm as a sequential signaling game. We prove ...
Previous theories of "nancial market rationing focussed on a single market, either the credit o...
In this paper we examine how the quantity of information generated about firm prospects can be impro...
Previous theories of financial market rationing focused on a single market, either the credit or the...
Abstract: Previous theories of financial market rationing focussed on a single market, either the cr...
Previous theories of financial market rationing focussed on a single market, either the credit or th...
The paper presents a simple model arguing that the pecking order theory is an extreme when there is ...
This paper analyzes debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment when a firm's insiders h...
This study investigates empirically the factors that determine whether firms borrow from banks and o...
[[abstract]]Considering conflicts between shareholders and managers, we revisit the external pecking...