Rent-Seeking Bureaucracies in a Schumpeterian Endogenous Growth Model : Effects on Human Capital Accumulation, Inequality and Growth

Some empirical works from the nineties have shown the existence of a negative relationship between inequality and growth. In this paper I show that the inefficiency of the Public Sector due to agency problems can be a new element that must be considered to explain the negative empirical relationship between inequality and growth. Considering a neo-Schumpeterian endogenous growth model, I envisage the relationship between rent-seeking bureaucracies and both the private market and political authority. I show that the inefficiency of the Public Sector can contribute to widening income inequality and reducing the per-capita output growth rate because of the skills waste in oversight of rent-seeking bureaucracies. Therefore bureaucratic quality can contribute to explaining the long-run negative relationship between inequality and growth. I show that these effects operates mostly in developed countries, where human capital accumulation and technological progress are fundamental engines for growth. Moreover, I show that more costly oversight reduces the consume of each existing product