A free entry model with linear costs is considered where firms first choose their entry time and then compete in the market according to the resulting timing decisions. Multiple equilibria arise allowing for infinitely many industry output configurations encompassing one limit-output dominant firm and the Cournot equilibrium with free entry as extreme cases. Sequential entry is never observed. Both Stackelberg and Cournot-like outcomes are sustainable as equilibria however. When the number of incumbents is given, entry is always prevented, and industry output is sometimes larger than the entry preventing level
I characterise endogenous market structures where leaders have a first-mover advantage and entry is ...
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite...
We consider an extension of Dixit-Shapiro's (1986) model of entry dynamics to the case when there ar...
A free entry model with linear costs is considered where firms first choose their entry time and the...
A free entry model with linear costs is considered where firms first choose their entry time and the...
A model with constant marginal costs is considered where firms choose first a period for production ...
This chapter deals with the theories of market equilibria when the number and characteristics of act...
In this paper we consider the traditional entry mode choice of an incumbent monopolist facing entry ...
In this paper we consider the traditional entry mode choice of an incumbent monopolist facing entry ...
Stewart (1994) presents a model of endogenous entry. In his article Stewart proposes the following t...
In many industries, the number of firms evolves non-monotonically over time. A phase of rapid entry...
This article aims to show that one can link imperfections of compe-tition to the occurrence of endog...
The timing of entry is a critical decision for a firm that is interested in a new industry. The deci...
Strategic market interaction is modelled as a two-stage game where potential entrants choose capacit...
This paper derives the equilibrium timing of entries and exits as well as the equilibrium output lev...
I characterise endogenous market structures where leaders have a first-mover advantage and entry is ...
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite...
We consider an extension of Dixit-Shapiro's (1986) model of entry dynamics to the case when there ar...
A free entry model with linear costs is considered where firms first choose their entry time and the...
A free entry model with linear costs is considered where firms first choose their entry time and the...
A model with constant marginal costs is considered where firms choose first a period for production ...
This chapter deals with the theories of market equilibria when the number and characteristics of act...
In this paper we consider the traditional entry mode choice of an incumbent monopolist facing entry ...
In this paper we consider the traditional entry mode choice of an incumbent monopolist facing entry ...
Stewart (1994) presents a model of endogenous entry. In his article Stewart proposes the following t...
In many industries, the number of firms evolves non-monotonically over time. A phase of rapid entry...
This article aims to show that one can link imperfections of compe-tition to the occurrence of endog...
The timing of entry is a critical decision for a firm that is interested in a new industry. The deci...
Strategic market interaction is modelled as a two-stage game where potential entrants choose capacit...
This paper derives the equilibrium timing of entries and exits as well as the equilibrium output lev...
I characterise endogenous market structures where leaders have a first-mover advantage and entry is ...
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite...
We consider an extension of Dixit-Shapiro's (1986) model of entry dynamics to the case when there ar...