Add to ORKGVote trading is ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very little about its properties. We explore this subject with a laboratory experiment. We propose a model of vote trading in which pairs of voters exchange votes whenever doing so is mutually advantageous. The resulting trading dynamics always converge to stable vote allocations–allocations where no further improving trades exist. The data show that stability has predictive power: vote allocations in the lab converge towards stable allocations, and individual vote holdings at the end of trading are in line with theoretical predictions. There is less support for the finer details of the trade-by-trade dynamics
The recent literature on logrolling or vote trading has been quite long on intuitive argument and ca...
The recent literature on logrolling or vote trading has been quite long on intuitive argument and ca...
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, ...
Vote trading is ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very little about its pro...
Vote trading is believed to be ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very littl...
Vote trading is believed to be ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very littl...
Vote trading is believed to be ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very littl...
Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple maj...
Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple maj...
Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple maj...
Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple maj...
We develop a framework to study the dynamics of vote trading over multiple binary issues. We prove t...
We develop a framework to study the dynamics of vote trading over multiple binary issues. We prove t...
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue,...
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, ...
The recent literature on logrolling or vote trading has been quite long on intuitive argument and ca...
The recent literature on logrolling or vote trading has been quite long on intuitive argument and ca...
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, ...
Vote trading is ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very little about its pro...
Vote trading is believed to be ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very littl...
Vote trading is believed to be ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very littl...
Vote trading is believed to be ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very littl...
Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple maj...
Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple maj...
Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple maj...
Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple maj...
We develop a framework to study the dynamics of vote trading over multiple binary issues. We prove t...
We develop a framework to study the dynamics of vote trading over multiple binary issues. We prove t...
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue,...
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, ...
The recent literature on logrolling or vote trading has been quite long on intuitive argument and ca...
The recent literature on logrolling or vote trading has been quite long on intuitive argument and ca...
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, ...