We reconsider the Goyal and Moraga-González model of strategic networks in order to analyze how government policies (e.g. subsidies) will affect the stability and efficiency of networks of R&D collaboration among three firms located in different countries. A conflict between stability and efficiency is likely to occur. When governments cannot subsidize R&D, this conflict will occur if public spillovers are not very small. However, when governments can subsidize R&D, the likelihood of a conflict is considerably reduced. Indeed, a conflict will arise only if public spillovers are very small or quite large
In a general setting with uncertainty and spillovers in R&D activity, we consider the incentive ...
We have investigated non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D policies in the framework of Spencer & ...
International audienceWe consider an oligopoly setting in which firms form pairwise collaborative li...
We reconsider Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez [Rand J. of Econ. 32 (2001), 686-707] model of strategic net...
We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collab...
We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collabo...
We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stabil...
n Bischi and Lamantia [4] a two-stage oligopoly game has been proposed to describe networks of firms...
We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D co...
This thesis uses an international economic framework to analyze the strategic role that R&D cooperat...
We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collabo...
The aim of this paper is to analyze the formation of R&D networks in a setting where spillovers ...
We analyze a model of R&D alliance networks where firms are engaged in R&D collaborations that lower...
In this paper, we extend the model of R&D network formation by Goyal and Moraga−Gonzàlez (2001...
The first study presents a novel analysis of horizontal R&D networks in the presence of an industry ...
In a general setting with uncertainty and spillovers in R&D activity, we consider the incentive ...
We have investigated non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D policies in the framework of Spencer & ...
International audienceWe consider an oligopoly setting in which firms form pairwise collaborative li...
We reconsider Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez [Rand J. of Econ. 32 (2001), 686-707] model of strategic net...
We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collab...
We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collabo...
We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stabil...
n Bischi and Lamantia [4] a two-stage oligopoly game has been proposed to describe networks of firms...
We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D co...
This thesis uses an international economic framework to analyze the strategic role that R&D cooperat...
We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collabo...
The aim of this paper is to analyze the formation of R&D networks in a setting where spillovers ...
We analyze a model of R&D alliance networks where firms are engaged in R&D collaborations that lower...
In this paper, we extend the model of R&D network formation by Goyal and Moraga−Gonzàlez (2001...
The first study presents a novel analysis of horizontal R&D networks in the presence of an industry ...
In a general setting with uncertainty and spillovers in R&D activity, we consider the incentive ...
We have investigated non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D policies in the framework of Spencer & ...
International audienceWe consider an oligopoly setting in which firms form pairwise collaborative li...