We show that a single-valued solution of nonatomic finite-type market games (or perfectly competitive TU economies underling them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of a core-selection (or, alternatively, a competitive payoff selection). (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA)
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assig...
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assig...
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assig...
International audienceWe prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition o...
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent bal...
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent bal...
Four axioms are placed on a correspondence from smooth, non-atomic economies to their allocations. W...
La version attaché à cette notice est la version soumise à publication.We prove the non-emptiness of...
Brangewitz S, Gamp J-P. Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games. Working Papers....
Initially we prove the nonemptiness of the core of an n-person game without side payments called a c...
Sudhölter P, Peleg B. A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games. Working Papers. Insti...
Abstract. Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concep...
We focus on axiomatizations of the Pareto equilibrium concept in noncoopera-tive multicriteria games...
J. Abdou, J.-M. Bonnisseau (dir.), G. Carlier (rapp.), B. Cornet, M. Florenzano, J.-J. Herings (rapp...
Norde et al.[Games Econ.Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the li...
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assig...
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assig...
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assig...
International audienceWe prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition o...
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent bal...
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent bal...
Four axioms are placed on a correspondence from smooth, non-atomic economies to their allocations. W...
La version attaché à cette notice est la version soumise à publication.We prove the non-emptiness of...
Brangewitz S, Gamp J-P. Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games. Working Papers....
Initially we prove the nonemptiness of the core of an n-person game without side payments called a c...
Sudhölter P, Peleg B. A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games. Working Papers. Insti...
Abstract. Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concep...
We focus on axiomatizations of the Pareto equilibrium concept in noncoopera-tive multicriteria games...
J. Abdou, J.-M. Bonnisseau (dir.), G. Carlier (rapp.), B. Cornet, M. Florenzano, J.-J. Herings (rapp...
Norde et al.[Games Econ.Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the li...
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assig...
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assig...
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assig...
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