Within an incomplete-information framework. we develop a model of wage determination in a unionized Cournot oligopoly. The assumption of incomplete information allows the possibility of strikes or lockouts, which waste industry potential resources, at equilibrium. Facing such deadweight loss, the government or the social planner may decide to adopt a policy, such as a profit-sharing scheme. Under two different bargaining structures (firm level vs. industry level), we investigate the effects of adopting profit sharing on the wage outcome and the strike activity. If the base-wage bargaining takes place at the industry level, then the introduction of a profit-sharing scheme increases the strike activity. But if the base-wage bargaining takes p...
We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option...
We examine the properties of profit-sharing in a game-theoretic oligopoly model of industry. Profit-...
This paper shows how profit sharing by firms with workers always facilitates increased collusion amo...
We develop a model of wage determination with private information in an unionized oligopolistic indu...
We develop a model of wage determination with private information in a unionized imperfectly competi...
We consider a model of wage determination with private information in an oligopoly. We investigate t...
There is no consensus among economists about the reasons why firms resort to profit sharing compensa...
When firms have private information a union may use a strike to reveal information about the firm. T...
We develop a model of wage bargaining with private information in a duopoly. We investigate how prod...
In a unionized duopoly with price setting firms market shares in different wage determination settin...
We develop a spatial two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized i...
Workers face declining pay-offs during a strike. The consequence of this is explored in a non-cooper...
First published: 31 July 1990We examine the properties of profit-sharing in an oligopoly model of in...
Profit sharing schemes have been analysed assuming Cournot competition and decentralised wage negoti...
Abstract: In a unionized duopoly with price setting firms market shares in different wage determinat...
We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option...
We examine the properties of profit-sharing in a game-theoretic oligopoly model of industry. Profit-...
This paper shows how profit sharing by firms with workers always facilitates increased collusion amo...
We develop a model of wage determination with private information in an unionized oligopolistic indu...
We develop a model of wage determination with private information in a unionized imperfectly competi...
We consider a model of wage determination with private information in an oligopoly. We investigate t...
There is no consensus among economists about the reasons why firms resort to profit sharing compensa...
When firms have private information a union may use a strike to reveal information about the firm. T...
We develop a model of wage bargaining with private information in a duopoly. We investigate how prod...
In a unionized duopoly with price setting firms market shares in different wage determination settin...
We develop a spatial two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized i...
Workers face declining pay-offs during a strike. The consequence of this is explored in a non-cooper...
First published: 31 July 1990We examine the properties of profit-sharing in an oligopoly model of in...
Profit sharing schemes have been analysed assuming Cournot competition and decentralised wage negoti...
Abstract: In a unionized duopoly with price setting firms market shares in different wage determinat...
We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option...
We examine the properties of profit-sharing in a game-theoretic oligopoly model of industry. Profit-...
This paper shows how profit sharing by firms with workers always facilitates increased collusion amo...