We analyze the principle of comparative advantage when agents in the world market are aware of the influence their individual supply exerts on the equilibrium exchange rate of goods, We show that specialization following comparative disadvantage can be an oligopoly equilibrium in a Ricardian economy. Moreover, for a wide class of economies, it is the only one. Nonetheless, when the number of agents in each country increases without limit, the equilibrium in which specialization follows comparative advantage again obtains
Comparative advantage, whether driven by technology or factor endowment, is at the core of neoclass...
We argue that it is the number of agents using market power, rather than the use of market power its...
Despite compelling rationale based on the theory of comparative advantage for free trade, many count...
This paper constitutes the very first treatment of the Shapley–Shubik (1977) market-game mechanism w...
We argue that it is the number of agents holding market power, rather than the presence of market po...
I explore the interactions between comparative, competitive and absolute advantage in a two-country ...
I explore the interactions between comparative, competitive and absolute advantage in a two-country ...
I explore the interactions between comparative, competitive and absolute advantage in a two-country ...
We argue that it is the number of agents holding market power, rather than the presence of market po...
This paper analyses the failure of the traditional Ricardo–Haberlerian (1817; 1936) theory of compar...
I explore the interactions between comparative, competitive and absolute advantage in a two-country ...
This paper presents a new model of oligopoly in general equilibrium and explores its implications fo...
I explore the interactions between comparative, competitive and absolute advantage in a two-country ...
This paper examines whether comparative advantage is the long-run outcome of an evolutionary process...
This paper studies a Ricardian model of international trade with a continuum of products in a genera...
Comparative advantage, whether driven by technology or factor endowment, is at the core of neoclass...
We argue that it is the number of agents using market power, rather than the use of market power its...
Despite compelling rationale based on the theory of comparative advantage for free trade, many count...
This paper constitutes the very first treatment of the Shapley–Shubik (1977) market-game mechanism w...
We argue that it is the number of agents holding market power, rather than the presence of market po...
I explore the interactions between comparative, competitive and absolute advantage in a two-country ...
I explore the interactions between comparative, competitive and absolute advantage in a two-country ...
I explore the interactions between comparative, competitive and absolute advantage in a two-country ...
We argue that it is the number of agents holding market power, rather than the presence of market po...
This paper analyses the failure of the traditional Ricardo–Haberlerian (1817; 1936) theory of compar...
I explore the interactions between comparative, competitive and absolute advantage in a two-country ...
This paper presents a new model of oligopoly in general equilibrium and explores its implications fo...
I explore the interactions between comparative, competitive and absolute advantage in a two-country ...
This paper examines whether comparative advantage is the long-run outcome of an evolutionary process...
This paper studies a Ricardian model of international trade with a continuum of products in a genera...
Comparative advantage, whether driven by technology or factor endowment, is at the core of neoclass...
We argue that it is the number of agents using market power, rather than the use of market power its...
Despite compelling rationale based on the theory of comparative advantage for free trade, many count...