Energy network regulation under soft political principals and legal recourse

In this thesis we address problems of distribution infrastructure regulation that a regulator faces when implementing regulatory regimes. We establish a stylized three-tier framework with a political principal, regulators and operators, based on findings from a case study of Germany and literature. This thesis contributes to the ongoing research on regulation of multi-objectives, where in theory the economic principles of regulating a monopoly are well known, but the implementation of these principles are rather contradictory, especially in the electricity sector where the transformation of the production urges a change of the role the network operators play and jeopardizes the security of supply. The challenges and new development in the electricity sector require further investments and raise new issues of coordination for the delivery of electricity and gas. The applied regulation is thereby a compromise between consumers’ interest in continued service provision and low tariffs against the interest of network owners and operators in capacity investments and high margins. Within the field of network regulation, this thesis focuses on the interplay between policy makers, regulators and operators.(IAG 3) -- UCL, 201