An Optimal key Enumeration Algorithm and Its Application to Side-Channel Attacks

Methods for enumerating cryptographic keys based on partial information obtained on key bytes are important tools in cryptanalysis. This paper discusses two contributions related to the practical application and algorithmic improvement of such tools. On the one hand, we observe that the evaluation of leaking devices is generally based on distinguishers with very limited computational cost, such as Kocher’s Differential Power Analysis. By contrast, classical cryptanalysis usually considers large computational costs (e.g. beyond 280 for present ciphers). Trying to bridge this gap, we show that allowing side-channel adversaries some computing power has major consequences for the security of leaking devices. For this purpose, we first propose a Bayesian extension of non-profiled side-channel attacks that allows us to rate key candidates according to their respective probabilities. Then we provide a new deterministic algorithm that allows us to optimally enumerate key candidates from any number of (possibly redundant) lists of any size, given that the subkey information is provided as probabilities, at the cost of limited (practically tractable) memory requirements. Finally, we investigate the impact of key enumeration taking advantage of this Bayesian formulation, and quantify the resulting reduction in the data complexity of various side-channel attacks