We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no” inclinations on some issue, and opinions may change due to mutual influence among the agents. Each agent independently aggregates the opinions of the other agents and possibly herself. We study influence processes modelled by ordered weighted averaging operators, which are anonymous: they only depend on how many agents share an opinion. For instance, this allows to study situations where the influence process is based on majorities, which are not covered by the classical approach of weighted averaging aggregation. We find a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence to consensus and characterize outcomes where the society ends up polarized. Our results can also...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...
We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no” inclinations on some issue,...
We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no” inclinations on some issue,...
We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no” inclinations on some issue,...
We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no ” inclinations on some issue...
Förster M, Grabisch M, Rusinowska A. Anonymous social influence. Games and Economic Behavior. 2013;8...
International audienceWe study a stochastic model of influence where agents have "yes" or "no" incli...
International audienceWe study a stochastic model of influence where agents have "yes" or "no" incli...
International audienceWe study a stochastic model of influence where agents have "yes" or "no" incli...
International audienceWe study a stochastic model of influence where agents have "yes" or "no" incli...
International audienceWe study a stochastic model of influence where agents have "yes" or "no" incli...
International audienceWe study a stochastic model of influence where agents have "yes" or "no" incli...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...
We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no” inclinations on some issue,...
We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no” inclinations on some issue,...
We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no” inclinations on some issue,...
We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no ” inclinations on some issue...
Förster M, Grabisch M, Rusinowska A. Anonymous social influence. Games and Economic Behavior. 2013;8...
International audienceWe study a stochastic model of influence where agents have "yes" or "no" incli...
International audienceWe study a stochastic model of influence where agents have "yes" or "no" incli...
International audienceWe study a stochastic model of influence where agents have "yes" or "no" incli...
International audienceWe study a stochastic model of influence where agents have "yes" or "no" incli...
International audienceWe study a stochastic model of influence where agents have "yes" or "no" incli...
International audienceWe study a stochastic model of influence where agents have "yes" or "no" incli...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...