We consider a model of wage determination with private information in an oligopoly. We investigate the effects of unions having relative concerns on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. We show that an increase of unions' relative concerns has an ambiguous effect on the strike activity
This paper describes a simple model of labor disputes based on the hypothesis that unions use strike...
In this paper, the authors examine the nature of the relationship between bargaining structure and s...
This paper develops a theoretical model of the simultaneous determination of union wages and union m...
We consider a model of wage determination with private information in an oligopoly. We investigate t...
Within an incomplete-information framework. we develop a model of wage determination in a unionized ...
We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option...
We develop a model of wage determination with private information in a unionized imperfectly competi...
We develop a model of wage determination with private information in an unionized oligopolistic indu...
We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option...
We develop a model of wage bargaining with private information in a duopoly. We investigate how prod...
We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We sh...
This paper introduces wage bargaining in the framework of Milgrom and Roberts (Econometrica 50(2):44...
When firms have private information a union may use a strike to reveal information about the firm. T...
We consider a two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized, imperfe...
We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We sh...
This paper describes a simple model of labor disputes based on the hypothesis that unions use strike...
In this paper, the authors examine the nature of the relationship between bargaining structure and s...
This paper develops a theoretical model of the simultaneous determination of union wages and union m...
We consider a model of wage determination with private information in an oligopoly. We investigate t...
Within an incomplete-information framework. we develop a model of wage determination in a unionized ...
We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option...
We develop a model of wage determination with private information in a unionized imperfectly competi...
We develop a model of wage determination with private information in an unionized oligopolistic indu...
We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option...
We develop a model of wage bargaining with private information in a duopoly. We investigate how prod...
We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We sh...
This paper introduces wage bargaining in the framework of Milgrom and Roberts (Econometrica 50(2):44...
When firms have private information a union may use a strike to reveal information about the firm. T...
We consider a two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized, imperfe...
We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We sh...
This paper describes a simple model of labor disputes based on the hypothesis that unions use strike...
In this paper, the authors examine the nature of the relationship between bargaining structure and s...
This paper develops a theoretical model of the simultaneous determination of union wages and union m...
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