We reconsider Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez [Rand J. of Econ. 32 (2001), 686-707] model of strategic networks in order to analyze how government policies (e.g. subsidies) will affect the stability and efficiency of networks of R&D collaboration among three firms located in different countries. A conflict between stability and efficiency is likely to occur. When governments cannot subsidize R&D, this conflict will occur if public spillovers are not very small. However, when governments can subsidize R&D, the likelihood of a conflict is considerably reduced. Indeed, a conflict will arise only if public spillovers are very small or quite large
International audienceWe study rival firms' incentives in quality-improving Research and Development...
n Bischi and Lamantia [4] a two-stage oligopoly game has been proposed to describe networks of firms...
In this paper we present the preliminary results of a graphtheoretical analysis of the network of R&...
We reconsider the Goyal and Moraga-González model of strategic networks in order to analyze how gove...
We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stabil...
The first study presents a novel analysis of horizontal R&D networks in the presence of an industry ...
We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stabil...
We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collab...
We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collabo...
Abstract. In this study, we analyze firms ’ membership in R&D (Research and Development) coopera...
We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collabo...
In spite of the abundant research on the relation between spillovers and the optimal outcome of coop...
We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D co...
In a setting of R&D co-opetition we study, by using an all-pay auction approach, how collaboration a...
International audienceIn this article, we extend the Goyal and Joshi's model (2003) of network of co...
International audienceWe study rival firms' incentives in quality-improving Research and Development...
n Bischi and Lamantia [4] a two-stage oligopoly game has been proposed to describe networks of firms...
In this paper we present the preliminary results of a graphtheoretical analysis of the network of R&...
We reconsider the Goyal and Moraga-González model of strategic networks in order to analyze how gove...
We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stabil...
The first study presents a novel analysis of horizontal R&D networks in the presence of an industry ...
We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stabil...
We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collab...
We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collabo...
Abstract. In this study, we analyze firms ’ membership in R&D (Research and Development) coopera...
We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collabo...
In spite of the abundant research on the relation between spillovers and the optimal outcome of coop...
We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D co...
In a setting of R&D co-opetition we study, by using an all-pay auction approach, how collaboration a...
International audienceIn this article, we extend the Goyal and Joshi's model (2003) of network of co...
International audienceWe study rival firms' incentives in quality-improving Research and Development...
n Bischi and Lamantia [4] a two-stage oligopoly game has been proposed to describe networks of firms...
In this paper we present the preliminary results of a graphtheoretical analysis of the network of R&...