The budget of a university essentially depends on the number of students it enrols. In multidepartment universities resources created in one department may be redistributed to other departments. This redistribution affects the way academics share their working time between research and teaching activities. Redistribution creates free-riding on teaching efforts. In this paper, we show that by designing internal financial rules which create yardstick competition for research funds, a multi-department university may induce better teaching quality and research, as compared to the performance of independent departments
This paper analyzes a competition game between two universities that teach and research in the same ...
This paper derives the optimal compensation contract when two asymmetrically verifiable tasks are ti...
Elite universities often receive massive grants from the Federal and State Governments due to their ...
In this paper, we combine the multi-department structure which characterises universities with the m...
We study the possible implications of incentive schemes as a tool to promote efficiency in the mana...
The budget of a university essentially depends on the number of students it enrols. In multi-departm...
The budget of a university essentially depends on the number of students it enrols. In multi-departm...
In this paper, we combine the multi-department structure which characterises universities with the m...
This paper evaluates the behavioural responses of multitask agents to the provision of incentives sk...
We address the following question: how does a higher education funding system influence the trade-of...
We address the following question: how does a higher education funding system influence the trade-of...
This paper explores the impact of university finance reforms on teaching quality. It is shown that t...
This paper addresses the following question: how does a higher education funding system influence th...
We derive the optimal compensation contract when two asymmetrically verifiable tasks are tied togeth...
In universities, education and research compete for the investment of money, time, and effort. This ...
This paper analyzes a competition game between two universities that teach and research in the same ...
This paper derives the optimal compensation contract when two asymmetrically verifiable tasks are ti...
Elite universities often receive massive grants from the Federal and State Governments due to their ...
In this paper, we combine the multi-department structure which characterises universities with the m...
We study the possible implications of incentive schemes as a tool to promote efficiency in the mana...
The budget of a university essentially depends on the number of students it enrols. In multi-departm...
The budget of a university essentially depends on the number of students it enrols. In multi-departm...
In this paper, we combine the multi-department structure which characterises universities with the m...
This paper evaluates the behavioural responses of multitask agents to the provision of incentives sk...
We address the following question: how does a higher education funding system influence the trade-of...
We address the following question: how does a higher education funding system influence the trade-of...
This paper explores the impact of university finance reforms on teaching quality. It is shown that t...
This paper addresses the following question: how does a higher education funding system influence th...
We derive the optimal compensation contract when two asymmetrically verifiable tasks are tied togeth...
In universities, education and research compete for the investment of money, time, and effort. This ...
This paper analyzes a competition game between two universities that teach and research in the same ...
This paper derives the optimal compensation contract when two asymmetrically verifiable tasks are ti...
Elite universities often receive massive grants from the Federal and State Governments due to their ...