Add to ORKGWe show in a simple model of entry with sunk cost, that a regulator prefers limiting the output, or capacity, of the incumbent firm rather than imposing a “Minimum Quality Standard” in order to help the entrant to provide high quality. As a by-product, our analysis makes a contribution to the study of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in a market with differentiated products
Imposing a minimum quality standard (MQS) is conventionally regarded as harmful if firms compete in ...
I study the regulation of a \u85rm producing a good with two attributes, e.g. quantity and quality. ...
In this paper we show that in an imperfectly competitive market the imposition of quantity restricti...
We show in a simple model of entry with sunk cost, that a regulator is best advised to limit the out...
We show in a simple model of entry with sunk cost, that a regulator is best advised to limit the out...
We show in a simple duopoly model of vertical differentiation that when a welfare maximizing regulat...
We show in a simple duopoly model of vertical differentiation that when a welfare maximizing regulat...
Between market unraveling and individual reputation building, markets for experience goods often exh...
Between market unraveling and individual reputation building, markets for experience goods often exh...
We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly...
We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly...
We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly...
This paper provides theoretical foundations for a price-and-quality cap reg-ulation of recently libe...
In a duopoly where two …rms ’ products are di¤erentiated both, horizontally and vertically, introduc...
This paper characterizes the optimal quality regulation of a monopolist when quality is observable. ...
Imposing a minimum quality standard (MQS) is conventionally regarded as harmful if firms compete in ...
I study the regulation of a \u85rm producing a good with two attributes, e.g. quantity and quality. ...
In this paper we show that in an imperfectly competitive market the imposition of quantity restricti...
We show in a simple model of entry with sunk cost, that a regulator is best advised to limit the out...
We show in a simple model of entry with sunk cost, that a regulator is best advised to limit the out...
We show in a simple duopoly model of vertical differentiation that when a welfare maximizing regulat...
We show in a simple duopoly model of vertical differentiation that when a welfare maximizing regulat...
Between market unraveling and individual reputation building, markets for experience goods often exh...
Between market unraveling and individual reputation building, markets for experience goods often exh...
We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly...
We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly...
We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly...
This paper provides theoretical foundations for a price-and-quality cap reg-ulation of recently libe...
In a duopoly where two …rms ’ products are di¤erentiated both, horizontally and vertically, introduc...
This paper characterizes the optimal quality regulation of a monopolist when quality is observable. ...
Imposing a minimum quality standard (MQS) is conventionally regarded as harmful if firms compete in ...
I study the regulation of a \u85rm producing a good with two attributes, e.g. quantity and quality. ...
In this paper we show that in an imperfectly competitive market the imposition of quantity restricti...