As a common practice, various firms initially make information and access to their products/services scarce within a social network; identifying influential players that facilitate information dissemination emerges as a pivotal step for their success. In this paper, we tackle this problem using a stylized model that features payoff externalities and local network effects, and the network designer is allowed to release information to only a subset of players (leaders); these targeted players make their contributions first and the rest followers move subsequently after observing the leaders' decisions. In the presence of incomplete information, the signaling incentive drives the optimal selection of leaders and can lead to a first-order mater...
We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different pr...
Förster M. Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks. Theoretical Economics....
We study the performance of a network of agents tasked with tracking an external unknown signal in t...
This paper examines the benefit of sequentiality in the social networks. We adopt the elegant theore...
In this paper, we examine how a seller sells a product/service with a positive consumption externali...
We introduce a tractable model of cheap talk among players located on networks. In our model, a play...
International audienceThis paper studies optimal targeting when the planner knows the architecture o...
We analyze a model of information centralization in teams where players can only exchange informatio...
We consider linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) network games in which agents have quadratic payoffs tha...
How do incentives to engage in costly signaling depend on social structure? This paper formalises an...
We provide new analytical results concerning the spread of information or influence under the linear...
Abstract: In the dynamic game we analyze, players are the members of a ?xed network. Everyone is ini...
Abstract — We consider social networks which contain agents that spread misinformation and refuse to...
Abstract. We argue that users in social networks are strategic in how they post and propagate inform...
discussions during the preparation of this paper. In social or organizational networks, it is often ...
We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different pr...
Förster M. Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks. Theoretical Economics....
We study the performance of a network of agents tasked with tracking an external unknown signal in t...
This paper examines the benefit of sequentiality in the social networks. We adopt the elegant theore...
In this paper, we examine how a seller sells a product/service with a positive consumption externali...
We introduce a tractable model of cheap talk among players located on networks. In our model, a play...
International audienceThis paper studies optimal targeting when the planner knows the architecture o...
We analyze a model of information centralization in teams where players can only exchange informatio...
We consider linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) network games in which agents have quadratic payoffs tha...
How do incentives to engage in costly signaling depend on social structure? This paper formalises an...
We provide new analytical results concerning the spread of information or influence under the linear...
Abstract: In the dynamic game we analyze, players are the members of a ?xed network. Everyone is ini...
Abstract — We consider social networks which contain agents that spread misinformation and refuse to...
Abstract. We argue that users in social networks are strategic in how they post and propagate inform...
discussions during the preparation of this paper. In social or organizational networks, it is often ...
We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different pr...
Förster M. Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks. Theoretical Economics....
We study the performance of a network of agents tasked with tracking an external unknown signal in t...