A study on the notion of altruism

This thesis examines the feasibility of altruism. Before illustrating the feasibility of altruism, it is necessary to clarify some misunderstandings of altruism. In Chapter one, I discuss the traditional view - binary demarcation of morality. I argue that binary demarcation causes serious misunderstanding and fails to reflect moral issues in reality. Instead, I propose a trinary demarcation, which is more justified and closer to the reality. I also provide an alternative (i.e. Weak Egoism), which fits trinary demarcation, and combines both egoistic and non-egoistic principles. In Chapter two, I start to explicate the notion of intuitionism, which provides an alternative to other normative ethics and virtue ethics. I justify the feasibility of altruism through the practice of intuitionism. And I share the basic idea of Henry Sidgwick, who provides three levels of intuitionism, namely, Perceptional, Dogmatic and Philosophical Intuitionism. It is known that Perceptional Intuitionism is a psychological reaction (i.e. the result of Role Taking). And it is comparable with the morality of Chinese Philosophy (e.g. Mencius). Both Dogmatic and Philosophical Intuitionism can be regarded as a moral reflection, which is available for all moral agents. Thus, intuitionism, I claim, is more universal and easier to practice when compared to normative ethics and virtue ethics. In Chapter three, I discuss the idea of Mencius (1A:7), in which a Perceptional Intuitionism can be found. Therefore, it requires no learning and deliberation. But, I argue that Mencius itself has some serious difficulties. The morality of Mencius cannot be extended to the others, as it fails to extend to the lamb. In other words, it can only provide limited altruistic motivation(s), and this motivation is bounded by the Perceptional Intuitionism. In Chapter four, I cite the work of Erich Fromm, who provides empirical perspectives from Anthropology and Neurophysiology. Fromm argues that aggression is not the innate human nature. Man is therefore not necessarily aggressive. Thus, I argue that Fromm's theory can be considered as the counter argument of egoism. Indeed, many people cite empirical example(s) of aggression to justify egoism. They think that man is born to be egoistic and therefore is naturally aggressive. However, the idea of aggression does not provide a sufficient condition to egoism. It is worthy to notice the distinction of Benign and Malignant Aggression, which is suggested by Fromm, and this distinction clears out some misunderstanding of aggression. Finally, in Chapter five, I review my thesis in a critical way. This critical review is not only a self-criticism, but also serves as a roadmap for further study. I say something about the relation between altruism and political philosophy. I consider political philosophy as an extension of moral philosophy, and I cite the work of John Rawls and criticize his notion of justice. I find that Rawls still uses a traditional view of binary demarcation in his theory of justice. Therefore, I claim it is feasible to revise Rawls' work from a trinary demarcation