Add to ORKGThis paper applies the financial intermediation and optimal contract theories to the standard Hotelling model. In it, we demonstrate that too little investment is undertaken and too much costly monitoring is involved in the unregulated banking industry. Thus, our model suggests a rationale for the government to regulate bank locations
This paper presents a dynamic model of imperfect competition in banking where the banks can invest i...
The optimal structure of the financial intermediation industry in a finite economy, where the role o...
In our model, banks, heterogeneous in terms of entry costs, compete a la Salop for depositors on the...
This paper applies the financial intermediation and optimal contract theories to the standard Hotell...
This paper studies a competitive Hotelling-style market with two symmetric banks that decide the pri...
International audienceThe relationship between the banking and microfinance sectors is a critical el...
<p>We present a contract-based model of industrial organization that allows us to consider in unfiie...
Abstract This paper presents a model whereby banking firms use various strategies (price and non‐pri...
Summary: We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either con...
We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or ...
This paper addresses the desirability of competition in banking industry. In a model where banks com...
We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or ...
Competition in the financial sector is more complex than in the rest of the economy. On the one hand...
In a model of spatial competition, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes in markets where the product ...
This paper presents a dynamic model of imperfect competition in banking where the banks can invest i...
This paper presents a dynamic model of imperfect competition in banking where the banks can invest i...
The optimal structure of the financial intermediation industry in a finite economy, where the role o...
In our model, banks, heterogeneous in terms of entry costs, compete a la Salop for depositors on the...
This paper applies the financial intermediation and optimal contract theories to the standard Hotell...
This paper studies a competitive Hotelling-style market with two symmetric banks that decide the pri...
International audienceThe relationship between the banking and microfinance sectors is a critical el...
<p>We present a contract-based model of industrial organization that allows us to consider in unfiie...
Abstract This paper presents a model whereby banking firms use various strategies (price and non‐pri...
Summary: We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either con...
We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or ...
This paper addresses the desirability of competition in banking industry. In a model where banks com...
We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or ...
Competition in the financial sector is more complex than in the rest of the economy. On the one hand...
In a model of spatial competition, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes in markets where the product ...
This paper presents a dynamic model of imperfect competition in banking where the banks can invest i...
This paper presents a dynamic model of imperfect competition in banking where the banks can invest i...
The optimal structure of the financial intermediation industry in a finite economy, where the role o...
In our model, banks, heterogeneous in terms of entry costs, compete a la Salop for depositors on the...