Mechanism design theory examines the design of allocation mechanisms or incentive systems involving multiple rational but self-interested agents and plays a central role in many societally important problems in economics. In mechanism design problems, agents typically hold private information that is unknown to the others. Traditionally, the mechanism design literature models this information asymmetry through random variables that are governed by a probability distribution, which is known precisely by all agents. However, the knowledge of such a distribution may be difficult to justify, especially when the available data is scarce. In this thesis, we address this concern by assuming that the underlying probability distribution is unknown b...
We introduce a new class of mechanisms, robust mechanisms, that is an intermediary between ex-post m...
We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders ...
Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings [Cai et al. 2012b], as lo...
We study a mechanism design problem where an indivisible good is auctioned to multiple bidders, for ...
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs t...
We study a robust auction design problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller seeks a mec...
My dissertation contributes to the literature on prior-free (robust) mechanism design. Prior-freenes...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] A crucial assump...
We investigate the problem of optimal mechanism design, where an auctioneer wants to sell a set of g...
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete info...
A crucial assumption in the optimal auction literature is that each bidder’s valu-ation is known to ...
We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent additive...
The field of algorithmic mechanism design is concerned with the design of computationally efficient ...
I study the design of auctions in which the auctioneer is assumed to have information only about the...
We investigate the problem of optimal mechanism design, where an auctioneer wants to sell a set of g...
We introduce a new class of mechanisms, robust mechanisms, that is an intermediary between ex-post m...
We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders ...
Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings [Cai et al. 2012b], as lo...
We study a mechanism design problem where an indivisible good is auctioned to multiple bidders, for ...
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs t...
We study a robust auction design problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller seeks a mec...
My dissertation contributes to the literature on prior-free (robust) mechanism design. Prior-freenes...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] A crucial assump...
We investigate the problem of optimal mechanism design, where an auctioneer wants to sell a set of g...
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete info...
A crucial assumption in the optimal auction literature is that each bidder’s valu-ation is known to ...
We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent additive...
The field of algorithmic mechanism design is concerned with the design of computationally efficient ...
I study the design of auctions in which the auctioneer is assumed to have information only about the...
We investigate the problem of optimal mechanism design, where an auctioneer wants to sell a set of g...
We introduce a new class of mechanisms, robust mechanisms, that is an intermediary between ex-post m...
We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders ...
Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings [Cai et al. 2012b], as lo...