Power and Negotiation

The volume produces new findings about the concept of power and about its applications in negotiations. Rejecting the notions of power as a resource and power as an ability, the work defines power as an act that is designed to cause another party to move in a desired direction, thus separating the concept both from its source and from its effects and leaving it open to much more detailed analysis. At the same time, this book examines perceived power on the basis of which symmetries and asymmetries in the relations between parties can be identified. As I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Rubin argue, negotiations between countries that are not equal in power tend to be more efficient and effective than during symmetrical negotiations. When weaker and stronger parties are negotiating, each knows its role and is able to get appropriate benefits in the agreement. In cases of symmetry or near symmetries the countries, whether equally weak or equally strong, tend to spend most of the time maintaining their status and allowing inordinate amounts of time to pass before reaching an agreement. These conclusions run counter to the most accepted wisdom of negotiations they do confirm evidence from careful experiments. The volume looks at negotiations with clear asymmetry (the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement, U.S.-Egyptian aid, U.S.-Indonesian aid, E.C.-Andorra trade association, Nepal-India water resource agreement, and the North-South coalitions at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development), two cases of symmetry (the Mali-Burkina Faso armistice negotiations and the U.S. Chinese armistice negotiations in Korea), and one mixed situation (Arab-Israeli peace negotiations). The book concludes with a careful examination of lessons for practice and lessons for theory