The power of voters in a voting game (simple game) is viewed as the amount they would be paid by a lobbyist buying their votes. Equilibrium prices for the voters are shown to exist whenever there is no veto player, and the expected incomes of the voters are compared with other measures of their voting power
Weighted voting games provide a simple model of decision-making in human societies and multi-agent s...
Abstract For measuring an individual's voting power of a voting game, some power indices are pr...
We examine two approaches to the problem of measuring the voting power of individuals in a voting bo...
For a lobbyist bribing a legislature, equilibrium prices for the legislators are shown to exist for ...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems as well as electoral systems and parliamentary...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple...
Two models are developed of the relative power of voters in a voting body, both based on the idea of...
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma....
A model is presented to describe how a calculating lobbyist should allocate resources most effective...
We offer a bargaining model for weighted voting games that is a close relative of the nucleolus and ...
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma....
This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legi...
Abstract This paper suggests an indicator of power in weighted majority games. An indicator of power...
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, ...
This paper deals with the assessment of inequality in the distribution of voting power. As voting pr...
Weighted voting games provide a simple model of decision-making in human societies and multi-agent s...
Abstract For measuring an individual's voting power of a voting game, some power indices are pr...
We examine two approaches to the problem of measuring the voting power of individuals in a voting bo...
For a lobbyist bribing a legislature, equilibrium prices for the legislators are shown to exist for ...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems as well as electoral systems and parliamentary...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple...
Two models are developed of the relative power of voters in a voting body, both based on the idea of...
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma....
A model is presented to describe how a calculating lobbyist should allocate resources most effective...
We offer a bargaining model for weighted voting games that is a close relative of the nucleolus and ...
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma....
This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legi...
Abstract This paper suggests an indicator of power in weighted majority games. An indicator of power...
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, ...
This paper deals with the assessment of inequality in the distribution of voting power. As voting pr...
Weighted voting games provide a simple model of decision-making in human societies and multi-agent s...
Abstract For measuring an individual's voting power of a voting game, some power indices are pr...
We examine two approaches to the problem of measuring the voting power of individuals in a voting bo...
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