Emission Trading in Europe with an Exchange Rate

This paper explores the analytical and empirical properties of a new method for emission trading according to a fixed exchange rate. The exchange rate is based on the ratios of the marginal costs of abatement in the optimal solution in order to account for the impact of the location of emission sources on the deposition. It is shown that, generally, this system will not achieve the optimal solution and does not guarantee that environmental deposition constraints are not violated, although total abatement costs are always reduced. A routine was developed to mimic trading as a bilateral, sequential process, subject to an exchange rate. In the example used, results for SO2 emissions in Europe will show that, starting from a uniform reduction, exchange-rate trading brings higher cost savings than one-to-one trading, without achieving the cost minimum. Sulfur deposition targets are not violated since the initial emission allocation overfulfilled targets in many places. The results are sensitive to: pre-trade emission levels, the transaction costs, the availability of information on potential cost savings, and assumptions made on the behavior of trading partners