We consider a dynamic, stochastic model of trading-institution selection with boundedly-rational traders where sellers produce with constant unit costs. Traders will in general fail to coordinate exclusively on market-clearing institutions. Rather, any institution biasing the price upwards is stochastically stable. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
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I study how savers allocate funds between boundedly rational firms which follow simple pricing rules...
In this paper we experimentally test a theory of boundedly rational behavior in a “lemons market. ” ...
We consider a simple pure exchange economy with two assets, one riskless, yielding a constant return...
We consider a dynamic, stochastic model of trading-institution selection with boundedly-rational tra...
We analyze a stochastic dynamic learning model with boundedly rational traders who can choose among ...
When alternative market institutions are available, traders have to decide both where and how much t...
We consider a pure exchange economy, where for each good several trading institutions are available,...
In this work, I study the behavior of boundedly rational agents in dynamic stochastic settings. The ...
This paper investigates theoretically and experimentally whether traders learn to use market-clearin...
When alternative market institutions are available, traders have to decide both where and how much t...
We develop a model to study market interaction between rational firms on one side of the market and ...
In this paper we examine the problem of dynamic adverse selection in a stylized market where the qua...
In a general equilibrium model with a continuum of traders and bounded aggregate endowment, I invest...
In this paper we examine the problem of dynamic adverse selection in a stylized market where the qua...
This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obt...
I study how savers allocate funds between boundedly rational firms which follow simple pricing rules...
In this paper we experimentally test a theory of boundedly rational behavior in a “lemons market. ” ...
We consider a simple pure exchange economy with two assets, one riskless, yielding a constant return...
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