THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. DETERRENCE POLICY (ARMS CONTROL, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, UNITED STATES)

This dissertation concerns the issues surrounding the debate over the strategic defense initiative and its implications for U.S. deterrence policy. While ballistic missile defenses (formerly called ABMs) were believed foreclosed from the nuclear balance as a result of the ABM Treaty, the SDI program has brought ballistic missile defenses back into the strategic equation. It is possible to suggest that missile defenses, as envisioned by President Reagan, may make a significant contribution to U.S. national security. Given this proposition, the dissertation follows the analysis as outlined below: (1) The original ABM debate of the late 1960s is reviewed with respect to the arguments of proponents and opponents of the ABM. This debate led the U.S. to accept the dominance of offensive nuclear forces in the nuclear balance. Additionally, the U.S. decided to adhere to a policy for assured destruction based on the precept of mutual national vulnerability. (2) While the U.S. had foresworn working on ballistic missile defenses during the 1970s, the strategic nuclear balance and foundations of deterrence have changed. As a result, the U.S. is seeking to evaluate the potential advantages of ballistic missile defenses. Three defense models are analyzed relative to their missions as well as major obstacles to their implementation. (3) United States strategic nuclear policy has evolved since the late 1960s to incorporate three major policy schools: assured destruction, countervailing, and nuclear war-fighting. Ballistic missile defenses fit with these policies in quite different ways. Additionally, a U.S. ballistic missile defense will have profound implications for the stability of the nuclear balance. There are a number of major obstacles to the integration of a missile defense into U.S. nuclear policy to include technology, program costs, and major political hurdles. (4) United States strategic offensive nuclear forces may be altered significantly by the deployment of a missile defense. However, new offensive weapons such as the cruise missile and advanced bomber could enhance the ability of offensive forces to penetrate strategic defenses. (5) A U.S. missile defense could effectively break up the ABM Treaty and spell an end to the arms control process. On the other hand, the SDI also may serve as an impetus to a new arms control treaty which incorporates reductions in offensive nuclear forces